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LEGAL CONCEPTS IN CASES OF El\IINENT
DOl\IAIN"
JOSEPH l\f. CORMACK 0

THERE is nothing original in a suggestion that in legal thinking
mental concepts should be used instead of physical. Possibly
the best-known e},.l>Osition of the thought is that of the late
Wesley N. Hohfeld.1 He e},.1>resses it as a matter of "differentiating purely legal relations from the physical and mental facts that
call such relations into being." He gives as 1·easons for the tendency to confuse and blend the two types of concepts, association
of ideas and defective terminology. Professor Hohfeld's sug. gested system of terminology 2 is designed to differentiate legal
relations from all others.
Possibly there is something 01iginal in a laboratory study of
certain of the materials of legal science in order to observe the
workings of the two types Qf concepts in the actual solution of
problems. It is with this thought in mind that the field of eminent domain is selected for investigation.
The principle underlying the law of eminent domain has become crystallized in the form of expression set forth in the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution: " •.• nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." The words "property'' and "take", to which detailed consideration will be given, have thus been encysted in the heart
of this branch of the law.
The principle of the juristic necessity of compensation to an
individual whose property is taken for public use, has been one.
of the most universally recognized principles of justice.3 It is
*Professor of Law, University of Southern California; nuthor of The
Tender Cases-A Drama of American Legal and F-inancial Hi<:tONJ
(1929) 16 VA:. L. REV. 132; The Universal Draft and Constitutional Limitations (1930) 3 So. CALIF. L. REV. 361.
1 HoHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICL\L
REAsONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS (1923) 27; reprinted from (1913)
23 YALE L. J. 16, at 20. Cf. Bingham, The Nature and Importance of
Lega~ Possession (1915) 13 IIIICH. L. REV. 535.
2 HOHFELD, op. cit. supra note 1, at 65; reprinted from (1917) 26 YALE
L. J. 710. His suggestions as to terminology are not followed nt nil points
in this article.
3 Grant, The "Higher Law" Background of the Law of Eminent Domain
(1931) 6 WIS. L. REV. 67.
Lega~
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found in the Roman law/ the Code Napoleon, 0 and in the legal
systems of the American colonies.6 The expression eminens dominium, with which the principle is now associated, seems first
to have been used by Grotius, in 1625.7 Provisions such as the
quoted portion of the Fifth Amendment have now been adopted
in the constitutions of all the states, save one.8 In that state,
North Carolina, the principle of Magna Charta that no person
ought to be deprived of his life, liberty, or property but by the
law of the land,9 has been included in the constitution,t0 and the
same result has been reached through judicial interpretation of
that provision.U In instances where, in the past, applicable constitutional provisions have been lacking, courts have nevertheless
held invalid legislative acts not recognizing the principle.1D In
addition, the requirement has been imposed upon the states by
the "due process of law" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.13
The word "property" is used by Hohfeld as an example of defective terminology. He says:
"Both with lawyers and with laymen this term has no definite
or stable connotation. Sometimes it is employed to indicate the
physical object to which various legal rights, privileges, etc., relate; then again-with far greater discrimination and accurncy
Matthews, The Valuation of P1·ope1·ty in The Roman Law (1{121), 34
L. R. 227, 252.
5 Bk. II, tit. 2, art. 545.
61 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN (2nd ed. 1917) 13, 22. As to the development of the principle in England, consult ibid. 6.
7 DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS, lib. iii, c. 20.
s The history of the adoption of the constitutional provisions is outlined
in 1 LEWIS, EMINENT DOMAIN (3d ed. 1909) 20.
9 MAGNA CHARTA, cap. 39, is rendered in STUBBS, SELECl' CHARTERS (Oth
ed. 1921) 297, following one of the Cottonian manuscripts (Cotton 1\IS,,
Aug. ii 36): "Nullus liber homo capiatur, vel imprisonotur, aut dissniaia•
tur, aut utlagetur, aut exuletur, aut nliquo modo destruatur, nee super cum
ibimus, nee super eum mittemus, nisi per legale judicium parium suorum
vel per legem terrae." The passage is translated in POUND, READINGS ON
·THE HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF THE COMMON LAW (2nd ed. 1913) 147: 11 No
freeman shall be taken, or impriso:ped, or be disseised of his froohold, or
liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any otherwise do·
strayed, nor will we pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by lawful judg·
ment of his peers, or by the law of the land.''
10 N. C. CoNST., art. 1, § 17:
"No person ought to be taken, imprisoned,
or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed or exiled,
or in any manner deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by tho lnw
of the land."
11 Staton v. Norfolk & Carolina R.R., 111 N. C. 278, 16 S. E. 181, (1802);
cj. Johnston v. Rankin, 70 N. C. 550 (1874); Phillips v. Postal Tel. Cablo
Co., 130 N. C. 513, 41 S. E. 1022 (1902).
12 Grant, op. cit. supra note 3, at 71.
13 Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 22G, 17 Sup.
Ct. 581 (1897). See Grant, The Natw·al Law Bacl~ground of Duo P')'OCC!Illl
(1931) 31 CoL. L. REV. 56, 71, 79.
4
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-the word is used to denote the legal interest (or aggregate of
legal relations) appertaining to such physical object. Frequently
there is a rapid and fallacious shift from the one meaning to the
other. At times, also, the term is used in such a 'blended' sense
as to convey no definite meaning whatever." 14
The usage first referred to may be desclibed as the use of a
physical concept, the latter of a mental. The one may be described as a concept of property as consisting of tangible physical objects, with which certain human beings are more or less
intimately connected; the other as a concept of property as consisting of legal relations between human beings, some of which
relations to a greater or less degree involve conh·ol over certain
physical objects. In the use of the former concept the lawyer's
mind is directed primarily toward things, in the latter to\":ard
human beings. The one deals with material substances, the
other with abstract conceptions. The one is objective, the other
subjective.
A difficulty in connection with the use of the physical concept
has been thus expressed by 1\Ir. Justice Holmes: "The fact
that tangible property is also visible tends to give a rigidity to
our conception of our rights in it that we do not attach to others
less concretely clothed." 1 ~ It is worthy of note that the viewpoint
of the Roman (and, therefore, of the civil) law seems to favor
the use of the mental concept of property. Thus in the Digest
we find the title De Adquirendo Renan Dominio.16 The reference is to the acquiring of ownei'ship of things, and not to the
acquiring of things as sucbP The word propl'ietQ..s in Roman •
law never means a material thing, but a legal position in regard
to it; the thing itself is '1mlteria. 18
"Take" is a term much like "transfer," which is used by
Hohfeld as an illustration of the difficulty, as regards legal ter14 HOHFELD, op. cit. supra note 1, at 28.
Compare Bowen, The Ccmccpt
of P1'ivate Proprrl"ty (1925) 11 CORN. L. Q. 41. But see Costigan, A Plnt
for a Modern Definition and Cla.Ssijicatimz of Real P1·opcrty (190!J) 12
YALE L. J. 425.
15 Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135, 155, 41 Sup. Ct. ·158, 459 (1921).
He
has beautifully described the variable quality of a v:ord, as follows: "A
word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged; it is the skin of n living
thought, and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used. 11 Tovme v. Eisner, 2·15 U. S.
418, 425, 38 Sup. Ct. 158, 159 (1918).
1s DIG. 41.1.9.6.
1 7 While Buckland provisionally calls dominium ovmership, he feels that
this is a little misleading, and prefers to consider dominima "the ultimate
right to the thing.'' BUCKLAND, A l\IANUAL OF Ro!IIAN PRIVATE LAW (19!!5)
110, 112. Res, like our "property", is sometimes used in a physical, and
sometimes in a mental, sense. Ibid. 107.
18 :MACLEOD, ELEMENTS OF ECONOMICS (1881) 143.
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minology, that many of the words used were originally applicable
only to physical things.19 He points out that the use of such
terms in connection with legal relations is, strictly speaking,
figurative or fictional, and essentially metaphorical. Confusion
and blurring of ideas are easy results of such a condition.
To take, from the standpoint of the physical meaning of the
word, means to acquire custody. The gist of the other, or mental,
usage possible in regard to the meaning of taking is placed by
Shakespeare in the mouth of Shylock. After the judgment of
the court the merchant of Venice says :
"You take my house when you do take the prop
"That doth sustain my house; you take my life
"When you do take the means whereby I live." 20
The prominent position of the work "take" in the American
law of eminent domain is fortuitous, but its influence has not
been thereby lessened. While the words "take" and "property''
cannot be dissociated in the present connection, the problem in
regard to choice of concepts is the same in regard to both.
A choice, in eminent domain cases, between the concepts which
have been discussed involves important consequences. Under
the physical concept it is necessary, in order that compensation
to the condemnee be required, that he be deprived of the posses~
sion of land or some other tangible physical object. Under themental concept, it is only necessary that there be interference
with some of the legal relations which, from the standpoint of
this concept, constitute his property.21
The two leading writers in the field of eminent domain dis·
agree as to which of the concepts should be used. Nichols ll 2
approves the former, and Lewis 23 the latter. Nichols supports
the physical concept largely upon the ground of adht'lrence to
precedent, and the use of the word "taken" in constitutional
provisions. Lewis supports the legal relations concept by quot·
ing the language of decisions which will be discussed in this
article.
It is the purpose of eminent domain proceedings to distribute
throughout the community the loss inflicted upon the individual
by the making of public improvements. In the light of this
public policy, the ideal to be aimed at is that the compensation
awarded shall put the injured party in as good condition as he
would have been in if the condemnation proceedings had not
HOHFELD, op. cit. Sttpl'a note 1, at 30.
THE MERCHANT OF VENICE, act. 4, sc. 1, 1. 375.
21 Notice will be taken later of the practical difficulties which render
impossible compensation because of every such interference.
22 1 NICHOLS, op. cit. supra note 6, at 299.
2a 1 LEWIS, op. cit. supra note 8, at 62.
19

20
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occuned.24 Nothing short of this is adequate compensation.::~>
The law of eminent domain is merely one method of approach
to the problems of the law of damages. As 1\Ir. Justice Holmes
has well expressed it, a constitution deals "with persons, not with
tracts of land."-2 6 Either a physical or a legal relations conception of the process is simply a tool for the use of the legal
profession in adjusting the relations of human beings. A choice
between the conceptions must be made upon considerations of
comparative usefulness for purposes of legal thinking in malting such adjustments.
Any concept is adequate if it produces proper results for the
.purpose at hand, 27 and during the early development of the law
of this country a purely physical conception of the process of
condemnation was amply sufficient. In Colonial times there
was little necessity for the use of eminent domain procedure.
There were no roads, nearly all land was unsettled and unimproved, and much had not been even allotted to private ownership. While the "marginal" land ~f the economists surrounded
all land which was used, land in small sh·ips had no appreciable
value. "'\Vhen a road was constructed, it simply traversed the
surface of the land, without cuts or fills, and there '":ere no
locomotives to belch forth sparks and fumes, or pipes to be laid
for public utilities.28 "Whenever there was any occasion for the
institution of eminent domain proceedings, the land was "t-aken"
in every sense of the word.:w Under these conditions, the physical concept of the taking of property for public use developed.
Its use was later encouraged by the adoption of constitutional ·
provisions containing the words "take" and "property," with
their physical connotations. The concept thus obtained a strong
hold upon the courts, so that Sedgwick, writing in 1857, stated
the law as follows:
"It seems to be settled that, to entitle the owner to protection
. . . the property must be actually taken in the physic.:'ll sense
24 See Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. United States, 261 U. S. 29!J, 304, 43
Sup. Ct. 354, 356 (1923).
21> This method of e.'\.1Jression is borrowed from )lr. Justice Campbell, in Grand Rapids & Ind. R.R. v. Heisel, 47 Mich. 393, 398, 11 N. W. 212, 215
(1882). It is obvious that practical difficulties of administration make
impossible anything more than approach to attainment of the ideal suggested.
26 Boston Chamber of Commerce v. City of Boston, 217 U. S. 189, 195,
30 Sup. Ct. 459, 460 (1910).
21 The writer is indebted to oral statements of Professor Walter Wheeler
Cook for this thought.
28 1 NICHOLS, op. cit. supi"CL note 6, at 14.
2n Statutes providing for the necessities of mills "were treated merely
as a regulation of the conflicting rights of the different riparian owners
in the stream." Ibid. 20.
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of the word, and that the proprietor is not entitled to claim
remuneratio!l for indirect or consequential damage, no matter
how serious or how clearly and unquestionably resulting from
the exercise of the power of eminent domain. This rule has been
repeatedly declared in many of the States of the Union." 00
After discussing the decisions, Sedgwick criticized this attitude on the part of the courts:
"To differ from the voice of so many learned and sagacious
magistrates, may almost wear the aspect of presumption; but
I cannot refrain from the expression of the opinion, that this
limitation of the term taking to the actual physical appropriation of property or a divesting of the title is, it seems to me, far
too narrow a construction to answer the purposes of justice,
or to meet the demands of an equal administration of the great
powers of government/' 31
In 1823 it was said, in the.Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in discussing the applicable provision of the constitution of that state, that it had "ever been confined, in judicial
application, to the case of property actually taken and appro·
priated by the government." 32
Mr. Chief Justice John B. Gibson, the great builder of the
law of Pennsylvania,33 advanced the novel contention that it was
necessary to leave some elements of compensation outside the
protection of the Constitution, in order to prevent excessive
awards. 34 In connection with early eminent domain proceedings,
the courts were so impressed with the drastic nature of the
expedient, in its effect upon the individual, that they were in..
clined to favor him in the matter of compensation. As the importance of public improvements in the development of the
country became more manifest, this feeling disappeared. The
sympathies of the courts then tended to be with those initiating
such enterprises.
Perhaps the strongest argument in favor of the use of a physical conception in this connection was made by Mr. Chief Justice
. Gibson in 1843, in Monongahela Naviga.tion Company v. Coons.an
It was held that the plaintiff was not entitled to compensation
because of the flooding of his mill as a result of obstruction of
the stream. The learned justice said:
SEDGWICK, STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1857) 519.
Ibid. 524.
32 1\Ir. Chief Justice Parker, in Callender v. Marsh, 1 Pick. (18 Muss.)
418, 430 (1823).
3 3 See excellent biographical sketch in MATLACK, 3 GnEAT Al\lEitiOAN
LAWYERS (1908) 353.
34 Philadelphia and Trenton R.R., 6 Whart. 25, 46 (Pa. 1840).
35 6 Watts & S. 101 (Pa. 1843).
30

a1
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"Now, it cannot be said that the plaintiff's mill vms taken or
applied, in any legitimate sense, by the State, or by the company
invested with its power; nor can it be said he was deprived of
it. . . . It is true, that a nuisance by flooding a man's land was
originally considered so far a species of ouster, that l1e might
have had remedy for it by assize of novel disseisin, or assize
of nuisance, at his election; but we are not to suppose that the
framers of the Constitution meant to entangle their meaning in
the mazes of the jus mztiqztwn. It was aptly said by Chief Justice Tilghman, in The Farmers' and 1\fechanics' Bank v. Smith,
(3 Serg. & Rawle 69), that conventions to regulate the conduct
of nations are not to be interpreted lilre articles of agreement
at the common law; and that where multitudes are to be affected
by the construction of an instrument, great regard should be paid
to the spirit and intention. And the reason for it is an obvious
one. A constitution is made, not particularly for the inspection
of lawyers, but for the inspection of the million, that they may
read and discern in it their rights and their duties; and it is
consequently expressed in the terms that are most familiar to
them. Words, therefore, which do not of themselves denote that
they are used in a technical sense, are to have their plain, popular, obvious, and natural meaning; and, applying this rule to
the conte:A-t of the Constitution, we have no difficulty in saying
that the State is not bound beyond her will to pay for property
which she has not taken to herself for the public use." :JG
The learned justice's assumption as to the understanding of
laymen seems correct, as applied to the word "take", which the
layman has occasion to use only in a physical sense. As to the
word "property'', however, it seems proper to ask whether laymen, as well as lawyers, do not use it when they desire to have
a general term covering every element of an individual's financial well-being. Is not the layman's thought represented by
the following statement: "These terms, 'life,' 'liberty,' and
'property,' are representative terms and cover every right to
which a member of the body politic is entitled under the law." 37
It is a remarkable coincidence that in the same op!nion, in
the Monongahela. case, Mr. Chief Justice Gibson should give
what is probably the most vivid judicial recognition of the
practical injustice resulting from the use of a physical concept
in eminent domain cases:
"It is not, therefore, enough to set before us a case of moral
wxong, ·without showing us that we have legal power to redress
it. Beyond constitutional restraint or legislative power, there
is none but the legislative will, tempered by its sense of justice,
Ibid. 113.
Sherwood, J., in State v. Julow, 129 1\lo. 163, 172, 31 S. W. 781, 782
(1895). Identical language, except as to the first word, is to be found in
another criminal case, Gillespie v. People, 188 Ill. 176, 182, 58 N. E. 1007,
1009 (1900).
3G

37
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which has happily been sufficient, in most cases, to protect the
citizen. Compensation has been provided for every injury which
could be foreseen, whether within the constitutional injunction
or not, in all laws for public works by the State or a corporation; though cases of damage have occurred which could neither
be anticipated or brought within the benefit of the provision
by the most strained construction. In one instance, a profitable
ferry on the Susquehanna, at its confluence with the Juniata,
was destroyed by the Pennsylvania Canal; and, in another, an
invaluable spring of water, at the margin of the river, near
Selinsgrove, was drowned. These losses, like casualties in the
prosecution of every public work, are accidental, but unavoidable; and they are but samples of a multitude of others; so
that the plaintiffs have at least the miserable good luck to know
that they have companions in misfortune: would that it were
in our power to afford them more solid consolation!" 38
He also wrote the opinion denying compensation in a situation
where, as he stated the facts, lowering the grade of a street
had left the plainti:(f's church building worthless, and had left the
ground on which it stood worth no more than the expense of
sinking the surface to the common level.39 He said that the
legislature had "never dreamt that it was laying the foundation
of such injustice," but held that it was unavoidable.40
In an early decision denying compensation in a situation where
the plaintiff had sustained loss through the erection of a rail~
road in the street by his land, it was said:
"The prohibition of the constitution is against taldng private
property without compensation, and not against injuries to such
property, where it is not taken. In this case, the private property
of the plaintiffs is not taken by the defendants; but the whole
allegation is, that it is injured by erections in its vicinity; and
the plaintiffs have not, therefore, any claim to have their damages ascertained and paid for before such erections shall be
constructed or used." 41
It was stated, in an early Maine decision, 42 that the records of
judicial proceedings showed that private property in railroads,
turnpike roads, toll bridges, and ferry ways had been often
greatly injured, and sometimes quite destroyed, by acts authorized by legislation, which, according to judicial decisions, did
as

Supra note 35, at 115.

ao O'Connor v. Pittsburgh, 6 Harris (18 Pa. St.) 187 (1851),
4° Ibid. 190.
See also Sharpless v. Philadelphia, 9 Harris (21 Pn. St.)
147, 166 (1853).
41 1\fr. Justice Edmonds, in Drake v. Hudson River R. Co., 7 Bnrb. 008
1
559 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1849).
42 Cushman v. Smith, 34 l\Ie. 247, 257 (1852).
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not violate any constitutional provision.43 To take a man's land
for public use was defined as "to deprive him of his title to it,
or- of some part of his title, so that the entire. dominion over
it no longer remains with him." 44
The fact that the public only acquires a revertible easement
in a highway was used, in an early case,"'~ to justify a refusal
of compensation46 when land was condemned for such a purpose.
It was said that in order to come "ithin the constitution there
"should be such a taking as divests the owner of all title to or
control over the property taken, and is an unqualified appropriation of it to the public." 4 7
The physical conception of the eminent domain process made
use of the word "property", as well as "take". Thus, in denying
compensation when a riparian owner complained of loss of the
benefits of navigation, it was said:
"What must be understood by the term private property in
the contemplation of the constitution?
"It appears to us that it applies to such property as belongs
absolutely to an individual, and of which he has the exclusive
right of disposition; property of a specific, fixed, and tangible
nature, capable of being had in possession and transmitted to
another, as houses, lands, and chattels." 48
Ibid. 257.
44Jbid. 260. Mr. Chief Justice Shepley also said, as dicta: "The (constitutional) provision was not designed, and it cannot operate to prevent
legislation, which should authorize acts, operating directly and injuriously,
_as well as indirectly upon private property, when no attempt is made to
appropriate it to public use. • . .
"The design appears to have been simply to declare, that private property shall not be changed to public property, or transferred from the
owner to others, for public use, without compensation; to prevent the personal property of individuals from being consumed or destroyed for public
use without compensation, not to protect such property from all injury by
the construction of public improvements; not to prevent its temporary
possession or use, without a destruction of it, or a change of its character."
Ibid. 258.
The following year the same court denied compensation in a case where
the plaintiff's mill had been damaged through diminution of the flow of
water because of the erection of a railroad embankment higher up the
stream. Mr. Chief Justice Shepley said: "No land, estate, or materials
owned by the plaintiff was taken; and he cannot be entitled to the remedy
provided by the statute in such cases." Rogers v. Kennebec & P. R.R., 35
1\Ie. 319, 323 (1853).
~Livermore v. Town of Jamaica, 23 Vt. 361 (1851).
46 This is contrary to the settled position developed by the courts in
regard to easements. See note 110, infra.
47 Mr. Justice Kellogg, in Livermore v. Town of Jamaica, supra note 45,
at 365.
4 8 Mr. Justice Handy, in Commissioners of Hornochitto River v. Withers,
29 Miss. 21, 32 (1855). In this case the complainant owned a plantation
bordering upon a former bed of the Mississippi River, through which
43
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In another case it was held that it was not a taking of the
plaintiff's dwelling house for a railroad company to render it ttn·
fit for habitation by permitting cars loaded with offensive freight
to stand upon the tracks within ten feet of the house. 40
In an interesting Wisconsin case, 50 later criticized in the same
court/1 it was held that the city of Milwaukee was not required
to make compensation, although it had caused a considernble
portion of the plaintiff's land to be washed away, with every
indication that the remainder would be destroyed. This result had
come about through the excavation by the city of a canal through
a strip of land which acted as a barrier between the plaintiff's
land and Lake Michigan, permitting the waves to rush through
with disastrous effect. It was reasoned that the case was not
within the constitutional provision, as the city "did not take the
property," but only "made a great public improvement in the
vicinity, which incidentally produced the injury complained
of." u2
enough water still flowed to keep it navigable. He alleged that a cnnnl
was being dug which would prevent the water from flowing tht•ough tho
<>ld bed of the river, thus depriving him of the use of it as a nnvignblo
body of water. A general demurrer was sustained, upon tho ground of
freedom of the government from responsibility for tho conscquoncN.I of
acts done to improve navigation. Following the quotation in tho toxt 1 it
was reasoned that the complainant's property in the water which flowed
through the old bed -of the river was subject to this limitation. Sec nlso
In the Matter of Dorrance-Street, 4 R. I. 230, 245 (1856).
4o Beseman v. Pennsylva:Qia R.R., 50 N. J. L. 235, 13 Atl. 164 (1888).
~o Alexander v. City of Milwaukee, 16 Wis. 247 (1862).
~1 In Pettigrew v. Evansville, 25 Wis. 223, 227 (1870), it was hold thnt
the defendant village could not, without paying compensation, drain tho
waters of a natural reservoir so as to cause them to go upon tho plaintiff's
land. The Alexander case was distinguished upon tho ground thnt thoro
the injury to the property of the plaintiff was remote and conscquontinl 1
as it came about only through the blowing of the wind in a particulnr di·
rection. The distinction is so weak as to imply a criticism.
In Arimond v. Green Bay and Mississippi Canal Co., 31 Wis. 3161 335
(1872), it was held that compensation must be made whore a lake \VIIS
2·aised by a dam so as to submerge the plaintiff's lnnd. Mr. Chiof Justice
Dixon admitted doubt as to the correctness of the decision in tho Ale}:•
ander case. He stated that "it was an extreme application of tho doctrine
of damnum absque injuria, and that the principle of it is not to bo OX•
tended to other and dissimilar cases, or to a case like tho present.'' The
Arimond case involved the same dam as the leading case of Pumpolly v.
Green Bay Company, infra note 62.
s2 Alexander v. City of Milwaukee, supra note 50, at 253.
It wna lilac
reasoned that even though the injuries could not be classed as remote and
speculative, nevertheless the city was not liable, upon tho ground of gov•
ernmental freedom from responsibility in doing work for the public boncflt,
Mr. Justice Paine concurred, at 257, upon the ground of adht'ronce to
precedent. He point!;!d out, however, that even though tho case \VIIS not
within the letter of the constitutional provision, with which he 11grocd1 in
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It was held that there was no taking of land for any purpose
under an ordinance which permitted an adjoining proprietor to
erect a party wall across the line of his neighbor's land without
consent, and which compelled the latter to pay half the cost
of any portion of the wall which he later used. It was reasoned
that the land was not taken from the owner in any sense, as
it remained his, together with the wall constructed upon it. He
was simply required to pay part of the cost of the wall in case
he used it.:;s
The obvious failure of such cases to award compensation for
serious losses, and the consequent failure to accomplish the social
purpose of eminent domain proceedings, were bound to produce
a revolt against the use of a physical conception of the process.
A change in methods of thought was first evidenced by judicial
recognition that, in cases of so-called destruction, i.e., c..1.ses
where continued use of land had been made impossible, there
had been, for legal purposes, a taking of property. The practical
futility of the distinction behveen taking and damaging was
there most apparent. Any holding that a destruction of property
constitutes a taking of it is a departure from a strictly physical
conception of taking. In the physical acceptation of the term,
there must be an appropriation by the taker from another. 1\:Ir.
Justice Brewer thus distinguished an earlier case, upon the
ground that it "was a case not of the taking, but of the destruction, of property." 54
his opinion it was entirely out of harmony with the spirit of the constitutional provision to deny compensation.
:;sHunt v. Armbruster, 17 N. J. Eq. 208, 214 (1865). It was correctly
held that there was no public purpose involved.
G41\1onongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312, 338, 13
Sup. Ct. 622, 631 (1893). He was discussing, in the lat~r case, the taJ..:ing
of a franchise, for which it was held compensation must be made. In the
earlier case which was distinguished, Bridge Co. v. United States, 105
U. S. 470 (1881), Congress had e..">:ercised a reserved power to withdraw
its consent to the construction of a bridge across a navigable river, after
construction had partially progressed. This was held to be a risk which
the company had voluntarily assumed when it chose to proceed under the
limited license which Congress had given, so that no compensation wns
required. The results in both cases were correct, but the distinction
should have been put upon the different character of the legal relations
involved.
In Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 502, 510, 43 Sup.
Ct. 437, 438 (1923), Il!r. Justice Sutherland said: "1£, under any power,
a contract or other property is taken for public use, the Government is
liable; but if injured or destroyed by lawful action, without a taking, the
Government is not liable." The refusal of compensation in this case was
proper, as the damage complained of was a legally remote consequence of
exercise of the war powers. The government had requisitioned the entire
production of steel plate of a certain plant for a year. This had made
impossible performance of a contract to deliver plate to the claimant. It
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The earliest cases treating a destruction as a taking were decided prior to a number of the cases already discussed, and before
Sedgwick wrote. Perhaps the first case of the kind was Crenshaw v. Sktte River Company, 55 decided in Virginia in 1828. A
law had been passed compelling a mill owner to erect loclcs,
under the penalty of having his mill abated as a nuisance. Without citing any cases, and without referring to nny authorities
other than Blackstone, it was held that eminent domain proceedings were necessary, Mr. Judge Carr saying:
"Here then, is a Law imposing upon the citizen a burthen,
which would render his property worthless, or destroying the
property in case he refuses to comply. The question forces
itself upon tts: Can such a Law bind? That the eminent domain of the Sovereign Power, extends to the taking private
property for public purposes, I am free to admit. But then, to
render the exercise of this power lawful, a fair co,mpensation
must always be made to the individual, under some equitable
assessment established by Law. This is laid down by the writers
on Natural Law, Civil, Common Law, and the Law of every
civilized country.... I must declare it as my solemn conviction,
that whether we judge this Law by the principles of all Civilized
Governments, by the Federal Constitution, or that of our own
State, it is unconstitutional and void." 50
In a Massachusetts case 51 decided four years later, tide water
had been permanently excluded from the plaintiff's land. It was
held that by this deprivation of the beneficial use of the land,
there had been, in a legal sense, a taking of it. In another case
the removal of the owner's dam which had protected a meadow
by keeping out salt water was held to constitute a taking of the
meadow.58
In a Massachusetts case 59 of the period of Rufus Choate, n
statute was involved which chartered a railroad and provided
that no other railroad should be authorized over its route within
a certain period. This was held to constitute a grant of an exwas also said, in regard to contracts: "Frustration and appropriation nrc
essentially different things." Ibid. 513, 43 Sup. Ct. at 439. Componsution
was awarded where the government through war-time requisition provented the petitioner from using water which it was entitled by convoy•
ance and lease to divert from a canal owned by another. Intornntionnl
Paper Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 399, 51 Sup. Ct. 176 (1931); sco
(1931) 4 So. CALIF. REV. 320.
55 6 Rand. 245 (Va. 1828).
ss Ibid. 264. The other judges concurred in sep'arute opinions.
51 Boston and Roxbury Mill Corporation v. Newman, 12 Pick. (29 Mass.)
467 (1832).
5s Glover v. Powell, 2 Stockt. (10 N.J. Eq.) 211 (1854).
59 Boston and Lowell R.R. v. Salem and Lowell R.R., 2 Gray (68 Muss.)
1 (1854)·.
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elusive franchise which could not be violated without compensation. During the argument Choate and other counsel endeavored
to induce the court to think of all forms of property in strictly
physical term.s.co In the opinion l\Ir. Chief Justice Shaw refused to do this, attaching significance to the use in the :i\1assachusetts Declaration of Rights of the term "appropriate", which,
he said, "is of the largest import and embraces every mode by
which property may be applied to the public use." ct
One of the leading cases in the field of eminent domain is
Pumpelly v. Green Bay Compa:ny,0 2 decided by the United States
Supreme Court in 1871. In this case compensation was awarded
because of the overflowing of land through the erection of a
dam for hydraulic purposes which raised the level of a lake.
In the opinion l\Ir. Justice l\Iiller said, in a passage which has
been widely quoted in later cases:
"It would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result, if in construing a provision of constitutional law, always understood to
have been adopted for protection and security to the rights of
the individual as against-the government, and which has received
the commendation of jurists, statesmen, and commentators as
placing the just principles of the common law on that subject
beyond the power of ordinary legislation to change or control
them, it shall be held that if the government refrains from the
absolute conversion of real property to the uses of the public
it can destroy its value entirely, can inflict irreparable and permanent injury to any e:hi:ent, can, in effect, subject it to total destruction without making any compensation, because, in the
narrowest sense of that word, it is not taken, for the public use.
Such a consh·uction would pervert the constitutional provision
into a restriction upon the rights of the citizen, as those rights
stood at the common law, instead of the government, and make
it an auth01ity for invasion of private right under the prete:l\.1;
of the public good, which had no warrant in the laws or practices of our ancestors." 63
This reasoning would seem to abandon the physical conception
of property entirely in eminent domain cases, but the opinion
limits the holding to cases "where real estate is actually invaded
by superinduced additions of water, earth, sand, or other mateiial or by having any artificial sh·ucture placed on it, so as to
effectually desh·oy or impair its usefulness." ct Thus the physical concept is preserved to the extent of requiring u physical
invasion of the land, and the case is distinguished by the same
60ibid. 25.
61Ibid. 35.
s213 Wall. (80 U. S.) 166 (1871).
63 Ibid. 177.
64 Ibid. 181.
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court in a later case upon the ground that in it there was "a
physical invasion of the real estate of the private. owner, and a
practical ouster of his possession." o:.
The course of the later decisions of the United States Supreme
Court dealing with the overflow of land, is as follows: In United.
States v. Lynah, in 1903,66 it was held that there had been a taldng
of the petitioners' rice plantation when an overflow, resulting
from works in the improvement of navigation on the Savannah
River, had turned it into an irreclaimable bog. It was pointed out
that even in the improvement of navigation or the performance of
other public duties the government could not appropriate property
without being under the obligation imposed by the Fifth AmendM
ment to make compensation. 67 As to the facts of the particular
case it was said : "While the government does not directly proM
ceed to appropriate the title, yet it takes away the use and value;
when that is done it is of little consequence in whom the fee
may be vested." 68 As instances of cases where there had been
no taking, Mr. Justice Brewer distinguished a case in which
access to land abutting on a navigable river had been destroyed
by the construction of a pier on the submerged land in front of
the upland, 69 and another in which a riparian proprietor had
been deprived of the use of her landing for the shipment of
products from her farm for the greater part of the gardening
season.70 A District Court case involving overflow from the
same improvements, but in which the injury could be remedied
at an alleged expense of $10,000, was distinguished upon the
ground that damage to such a limited extent constituted only
consequential injury.71 It was admitted that theoretically there
is no limit to what engineering skill might accomplish, but it was
made a "practical matter" of degree how far the damage would
have to go to constitute a taking. 72
65 Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U. S. 635, 642 (1878),
In thia
case the plaintiff complained of obstruction of access to its lot during tho
construction of a tunnel under the Chicago River. It was held that thoro
had been no taking of the plaintiff's property, that any work authorized
by law could not constitute a nuisance, and that the city wns exempt :from
liability in the proper performance of the work ns tho agent of the stnto
in the performance of a public function. It was pointed out that, unlilto
the Pumpelly case, there had been no invasion of the plaintiff's lot, that
all that had been done was "to render for a time its use more inconM
venient." Ibid.
•
o6 188 U. S. 445, 23 Sup. Ct. 349 (1903).
o1 Ibid. 4'11, 23 Sup. Ct. at 357.
os Ibid. 470, 23 Sup. Ct. at 357. It was held that when tho componsa·
tion was paid the fee and the riparian rights passed to tho government.
G9 Ibid. 472, 23 Sup. Ct. at 357, discussing Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U. S.
141, 21 Sup. Ct. 48 (1900).
7 0 Ibid. 473, 23 Sup. Ct. at 358, discussing Gibson v. United States, 100
U. S. 269, 17 Sup. Ct. 578 (1897).
7 .1 Ibid. 473, 23 Sup. Ct. at 358, discussing Mills v. United States, 40
Fed. 738 (S.D. Ga. 1891).
72 Ibid. 474, 23 Sup. Ct. at 358.
Three members of the court dlssontetl
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A year later, Bedford v. United States 13 was decided. The
effect of revetments erected by the government for the improvement of navigation had been to prevent the 1\Iississippi River
from gradually lessening, through natural causes, the force of
the current directed against the claimants' land. A tract of 2300
acres was being eroded, and had been overflowed for a number
of years. The Pwnpelly and Lynah cases were distinguished
upon the ground that in them there had been "an actual inv:1sion
and appropriation of the land as distinguished from conEcquential damage." 74 The claimants were denied compensation, 1\Ir.
Justice l\:IcKenna saying:

"In the case at bar the damage v,;as sh·ictly consequential.
It was the result of the action of the river through a course of

years. The case at bar, therefore, is distinguishable from the
Ly1w.h case in the cause and manner of the injury. In the Lynah
case the works were constructed in the bed of the rh·er, obstructed the natural flow of its water, and '"ere held to have
caused, as a direct consequence, the overflow of Lynah's plantation. In the case at bar the works ''·ere constructed along the
banks of the river and their effect was to resist erosion of the
banks by the waters of the river. There was no other interference with natural conditions. Therefore, the damage to appellants' land, if it can be assigned to the works at all, was but an
incidental consequence of them." ';
The following year, in Il!aniga.ult 'l'. Springs,'6 where an overflow to a "minor extent" was involved, it. was again held that
there is no taking where the plaintiff is "merely put to some
e~'ira e~'}>ense."

77

upon the ground that there had been no overflowing, but only nn interference with drainage, which constituted only consequential damage. It
was said in the dissenting opinion that if it were to be held that t11ere
bad been an overflowing, there still had been no taking of the property,
as the overflowing could have been stopped by raising the embankment
surrounding the plantation. Ib:d. 484, 23 Sup. Ct. at 3G2. Mr. Justice
1\!cKenna did not participate in the decision.
73192 U. S. 217, 24 Sup. Ct. 238 (1904).
74 Ibid. 225, 24 Sup. Ct. at 240.
75 Ibid. 224, 24 Sup. Ct. at 240.
76199 U. S. 473, 26 Sup. Ct. 127 (1905).
77 Ibid. 484, 26 Sup. Ct. at 132. In Jackson v. United States, ::!30 U. S.
1, 33 Sup. Ct. 1011 (1913), it was held that it was not open to the petitioners, who bad built a levee to protect their own land, to claim that the
same land had been partially taken because the effect of the general system
of construction of levees along the l\Iississippi River was to keep v:at\.'r
from escaping from the river during high water periods, and thus to increase the pressure against the petitioners' levee. It seems clear that this
decision represented sound social policy. Everyone along the river should
be required to engage in "team work'' to curb the annual flood menace, and
there should be no complaint in regard to what others reasonably may
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In United States v. Cress, decided in 1917,78 it appeared that
land had been subjected to "a permanent liability to intermittent
but inevitably recurring overflows" through the construction of
locks and dams to improve navigation. It was argued that there
had been no taking of the land because it had been depreciated
in value only fifty per cent. Mr. Justice Pitney said, in reply
to this, that "it is the character of the invasion, not the amount
of damage resulting from it, so long as the damage is substantial,
that determines the question whether it is a taking." 10 It was
held that there had been a partial taking, for which compensation
must be made. The amount involved was comparatively small/t'
and ·the question whether the plaintiff could have prevented tho
loss through protective engineering works was not discussed.
In another case it was held that where land was flooded by a
government irrigation reservoir there could be no recovery because of destruction of the business conducted upon the land, or
because of the enforced sale of cattle. 81 Mr. Justice McReynolds
assigned as the reason for this, that "there was no actual tnldng
of these things by the United States, and consequently no basis
for an implied promise to make compensation." 82
The latest pronouncement of the court upon the question is
that of Mr. Justice Sutherland, in 1924, that in order to constitute a taking "it is, at least, necessary th{l.t the overflow be
the di;rect result of the structure, and constitute an actual, permanent invasion of the land, amounting to an appropriation of
and not merely an injury to the property." 83
If an attempt be made to reconcile these cas(ls, it may be said
that the position of the United States Supreme Court is that
in order· that a flooding of land may constitute a taking, it is
necessary that the following requirements be satisfied: that the
physical facts involved be not too complicated ;84 that there be a
do in that regard. If it were desirable, it would not be feasible to distribute such losses.
78 243 U. S. 316, 37 Sup. Ct. 380 (1917).
79 Ibid. 328, 37 Sup. Ct. at 385.
so Fifty per cent of the value of the overflowed land was $495. In addition the plaintiff was held entitled to recover $500 because of tho dostruction of a ford, and the parties in a companion case covered by tho opinion
were awarded $1500 because of the cutting off of the water power of a mtll.
81 Bothwell v. United States, 254 U. S. 231, 41 Sup. Ct. 74 (1920).
82 Ibid. 233, 41 Sup. Ct. at 75.
To the same effect, Mitchell v. United
States, 267 U. S. 341, 45 Sup. Ct. 293 (1925) (not an overflow case).
sa Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U. S. 146, 149, 44 Sup. Ct. 204, 205
(1924). In this case the court felt that upon the facts the most that could
be said in favor of the claimant was that land which previously had been
subject to periodical overflows had probably been subjected to somo increased flooding.
84 Witness the quoted distinction between the Lynah and Bedford cases,
in the latter decision, supra note 75.
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permanent or intermittent physical invasion of the land; that the
loss substained be substantial, and not relate to a business conducted upon the land; and that the situation be such that the
landowner cannot obviate the loss through protective engineering works with a reasonable expenditure of funds.s:;
It was held, by the same court, that compensation is necessary
when a franchise is taken.80 This is a recognition of intangibles,
but 1\:Ir. Justice Brewer, in a dict-um, argues for the retention
of a strictly objective point of view in dealing with questions
1·elating to property under the Fifth Amendment. He bases
his -contention upon the language used in the Constitutional provision:
· "And this just compensation, it will be noticed, is for the
property, and not to the owner. Every other clause in this Fifth
Amendment is personal. 'No person shall be held to answer for
a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,' etc. Instead of continuing that form of statement, and saying that no person shall be
deprived of his property without just compensation, the personal element is left out, and the 'just compensation' is to be a
"
full equivalent for the property taken." 81
The cases which have been considered, recognizing a so-called
destruction as a taking, have gotten away from the most nar1·ow
physical viewpoint, that, in order to constitute a taking, the possession of land or other tangible objects must be removed from
the owner and appropriated by the taking authority. But unless a further advance is made, many cases of serious loss to
the individual will still remain uncompensated. The courts are
left in the position thus stated oracularly in a Maryland case:
"Every taking involves an injury of some kind, though every
injury does not include a taking." ss And, while physicallimit.'1tions are retained in the methods of thought, a determination as
to which injuries are to be considered takings, and thus receive
compensation, will not be- reached, as it should be, upon considerss Mr. District Judge Grubb, after discussing the United Srotes Supreme
C-ourt flooding cases, reaches the following conclusion: "A fair construction of these decisions leads to the conclusion that, in order that a flooding
of lands may constitute a 'taking,' it must be not only a direct physical
· invasion of private pr.Qperty, but must also act as an actual ouster and
cause a practical destruction of the value of the land.'' Coleman v. Unitfld
States, 181 Fed. 599, 603 (C. C. N. D. Ala. 1910). The cnses are re\'iewed
in Walls v. United States, 44 Ct. Cl. 482 (1909), and Tompkins v. United
States, 45 Ct. Cl. 66 (1910).
ss Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United Stat.es, supra note 54.
87 Ibid. 326, 13 Sup. Ct. at 626.
In addition to the franchise, tangible
property was taken.
88 Mr. Justice McSherry, in Garrett v. Lake Roland E. Ry., 79 1\ld. 277,
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ations having to do with the social policy of eminent domain
proceedings, or relating to practical expediency. The decision
will turn upon the accidental presence or absence, along the lines
already pointed out, of certain physical facts.
The leading case taking another step, and treating the emi~
nent domain process as one of interference with valuable legal
relations, is Eaton v. B. G. & 111. R. R.,89 decided by the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire in 1872, the year following the Pump·
elly decision. The facts involved were again those of overflow,Po
The opinion was written by the learned Mr. Justice Jeremiah
Smith, later the distinguished professor of law at Harvard. Tho
opinion is as able as it is long, and is perhaps the best known
and most influential of those written by him. 01 He said:
"The vital issue then is, whether the injuries complained of
amount to a taking of the plaintiff's property, within the consti·
tutional meaning of those terms. It might seem that to state
such a question is to answer it; but an examination of the auw
thorities reveals a decided conflict of opinion. The constitutional
prohibition (which exists in most, or all, of the States) has
received, in some quarters, a construction which renders it of
comparatively little worth, being interpreted much as if it read,'No person shall be divested of the formal title to property with·
out compensation, but he may, without compensation, be deprived
of all that makes the title valuable.' To constitute a 'taking of
property', it seems to have sometimes been held necessary that
there.should be 'an exclusive appropriation', a 'total assumption
of possession', 'a complete ouster', an absolute or total conver~
tion of the entire property, a 'taking the property altogether'.
These views seem to us to be founded on a misconception of
the meaning of the term 'property', as used in the various State
constitutions.'' 92
He proceeds to point out that "in a strict legal sense, land is
not 'property,' but the subject of property;" that while the term
"property" is, in common parlance, frequently applied to a tract
of land or a chattel, in its legal signification it t•efers to legal
relations. Interference with those relations, he continues, takes
the owner's property. 93 If the defendants were correct in thoir
282, 29 Atl. 830, 832 (1894).
so 51 N. H. 504 (1872).
90 It was stated that at times the water carried sand, gravel, and stones
upon the plaintiff's land.
91 "In this masterly essay on the nature of property, the force of nn un·
constitutional statute, and the meaning of a 'taking' by eminent domain,
Judge Smith established the law as it is generally hold today upon nn
imp:regnable basis." Beale, Jeremiah Smith (1921) 35 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2.
92 Eaton v. B. C. & M. R.R., snpra note 89, at 611.
9
3 He also reasoned that if the land itself were to be considered the property, the practical result would be the same, as it would have to be inferred
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contention that they had a right to flood the plaintiff's land, they
''"ould have an easement in it. But an easement is property, and
could have been acquired by the defendants only tlu·ough subtraction from the legal relations constituting the plaintiff's
property. This the constitution does not permit without compensation. The plaintiff having received no compensation for the
easement,94 it does not exist, and the plaintiff is entitled to his
damages.9 :;
The doctrine of the Eaton case was applied in another overflow case, in the same court, in an opinion written by 1\:Ir. Justice
Charles Doe, "one of the greatest of our American judges." !)r. He
said:
"Property in land must be considered, for many purposes, not
as an absolute, unrestricted dominion, but as an aggregation of
qualified privileges, the limits of which are prescribed by the
equality of rights, and the correlation of rights and obligations
necessary for the highest enjoyment of land by the entire community of proprietors.... Property is taken, when any one of
those proprietary rights is taken, of which property consists." or
Lewis quotes lVCr. Justice Doe at length with approval.03
Nichols takes the opposite view.n~ He feels that it is "only by an
e},._·:tremely technical argument" that the New Hampshire court is
able to interpret the word "take" as it does, and that tlris is not
a proper method of interpretation of the language of constitution
that the framers of the constitution intended to protect the essentinl elements of ownership which give the property value, and not to protect "mere
empty titles, or barren insignia of ownership.'' Ibid. 512. The damage
was said to be "consequential," in the sense of having occurred following
the lapse of a period of time after the defendants' acts, but was said to be
what Sir William Erie had called "consequential damage to the actionable
degree." Ibid. 513, citing Brand v. H. & C. Ry., L. R. 2 Q. B. 223, 249
(1867).
94 It was held that eminent domain proceedings previously directed
against the plaintiff had related only to acts done by the defendants on the
plaintiff's land, whereas the overflowing now complained of resulted from
acts on the land of another. Ibid. 515.
9 S The suit was an action on the case to recover damages for a talting
not covered by eminent domain proceedings. The New Hampshire {;Onstitution contained no provision that private property should not be taken
for public use without compensation, but the learned justice thought of
the problem in those terms, and held that such a provision was to be im-

plied from the spirit and tenor of the whole instrument. Ibid. 510. There
was a provision that no part of a man's property should be taken from
him, or applied to public uses, without his consent. N. H. CONST. pt. 1,
art. 12.
96 Beale, op. cit. supra note 91, at 2.
97 Thompson v. Androscoggin Co., 54 N. H. 545, 551 (1874).
t~s 1 LEWIS, lJP· cit. supra. note 8, at 62.
99 1 NICHOLS, op. cit. supra note ·s, at 293 ff.
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makers who used "an expression which, to the lay mind at least,
meant something wholly different." 100 He states that the fallacy
of the argument of the New Hampshire court ,.lies in its as·
sumption that the property rights of an individual against other
individuals are the same as they are against the public." 101 He
contends that the constitutional provisions should be interpreted
in the light of the law as it existed prior to their adoption, and
therefore concludes that whatever one might think of the ab·
stract logic of the Eaton case, it came ,.too late to stand on its
merits as an interpretation of the constitution." tQJ
Such a method of approach is to be criticized in that it is purely
legalistic. It gives no consideration to the requirements of the
social policy to be effected through eminent domain proceedings.
It affords no opportunity for an advancing civilization, con·
fronted with changing and more complicated conditions, to give
effect to the social policy set forth in certain words, by using a
more abstract conception in their interpretation than was re·
quired in early times. Processes of growth and development in
constitutional interpretation are utterly denied. The assumption
of the New Hampshire justices, that the property rights of an
individual against the public are the same as his rights against
other individuals, seems to be entirely justified, as applied to the
awarding of compensation in eminent domain proceedings.103 It
is implicit in the nature of such proceedings that society desires
to purchase from an individual the property rights recognized in
him under a legal system designed to adjust his relations with
other individuals. The only difference that should exist between
a sale to society and one to an individual is that the former may
acquire property that the latter could not buy.
Before the Eaton case, Mr. Chief Justice Shaw of Massachtt·
setts handed down the first decision holding that a railroad is
entitled to compensation when its line is crossed by a highway.
He said that if the public use of land or chattels deprived the
owner of possession or "some beneficial enjoyment," his property
had been "appropriated" to public use, and he was entitled to
compensation.104 In the leading case of City of St. Louis v. llill,
Ibid. 299.
101Ibid, 297.
1o.2Ibid. 301. Although disagreeing with the Eaton case, he stntes thnt

100

the decision, "remarkable for its strength of logic and clearness o.f ron~
soning, attracted and retained the attention of the legal profession th1•oughout the country." Ibid. 296.
1oasee note 189, infra.
104 Old Colony and Fall River R.R. v. County of Plymouth, 14 Gray (80
Mass.) 155, 161 (1859).
In 1874 the leading case of Grand Rapids Booming Compnny v. Jarvis
was decided by the Supreme Court of Michigan. This case involved facts
of overflow. In a famous passage Mr. Justice Christinncy asked: "Of
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a city ordinance imposing a building line resh·iction 'vas held
invalid, because it constituted a taking of private property, even
though "title to the property and the right to use the same are
still in the defendant." 10:;
In a New Jersey case, Pennsylvania R. R. t-•. A:ngcl, a similar
holding was made in dealing with a nuisance from the operation
of a railroad. 1\:Ir. Justice Di.xon said, in a ·widely quoted pa::sage:
"\\Thether you flood the farmer's fields so that they cannot be
cultivated, or pollute the bleacher's sh·eam so that his fabrics
are stained, or fill one's dwelling with smells and noise so that it
cannot be occupied in comfort, you equally take away the owner's
property." 1o8
In a similar case in the United States Supreme Court, 1\Ir.
Justice Pitney said that while the legislature might legalize what
otherwise would be a public nuisance, it could not "confer immunity from action for a private nuisance of such a character
as to amount in effect to a taking of private property for public
use." 107 The same court held on demurrer that it would constitute a taking of land for the government to install a battery
in a fort for the purpose of firing projectiles at will across the
area in time of peace.10s
Title consists of an aggregate of valuable legal relations vested
in the person called the owner.1w Throughout legal history it has
been the practice to treat as separate entities for legal and commercial purposes certain sub-groups of legal relations included
within the aggregate known as title. Due to the methods of
thought thus historically developed, the courts have had no difficulty in recognizing as a taking of property any interference
with such a sub-group of legal relations. Here property has
always been looked at from a legal relations standpoint. This
applies to situations where easements 110 or profits a prendre 111
what does property practically consist, but of the incidents which the law
has recognized as attached to the title, or right of property? Is not the
idea of property in, or title to lands, apart from, and stripped of all its
incidents, a purely metaphysical abstraction, as immaterial and useless tiJ
the owner as 'the stuff that dreams are made of'? Is it not n much less
injury to him, if it can injure him at all, to deprive him of this abstraction, than of the incidents of property, which alone render it practicably
valuable to him'Z" 30 Mich. 308, 320 (1874).
1o.; 116 Mo. 527, 22 S. W. 861 (1893).
10814 Stewart (14 N. J. Eq.) 316, 329 (1886).
101

Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U. S. l.i4G, l.iu3, ::a Sup. Ct.

654, 657 (1914).
tos Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U. S. 327,

43 Sup. Ct. 135 (1922).
1o9

HoHFELD, op. cit. supra note 1, at 162.

cit. supra, note
6, at 346. As to violation of restrictions in deeds, see Note (1930) 19
no 1 LEwis, op. cit: supra, note 8, at 428; 1 NICHOLS. op.

CALIF. L. REV. 58.
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have been obstructed, or where in effect easements have been
imposed on land in favor of the public, as through building line u:l
or zoning l·estrictions 113 (not justified under the police power), or
where there has been interference with riparian rights. 114 In an
oft-cited passage Mr. Justice Pitney stated that the right to
have water flow away from a mill dam unobstructed, except as
in the course of nature, "is not a mere easement or appurtenance,
but exists by the law of nature as an inseparable part of the
land." 11 " Franchises, also, have been a historically recognized
species of property, and it has never been doubted that componM
sation i's required whenever they are taken. 110 There should be
no doubt in regard to other forms of con~racts. 117
Licenses are not protected against obstruction by third parties, cithor
in eminent domain or other connections. 2 LEWIS, op. cit. sttpra note 8,
at 958; 1 NICHOLS, op. cit. supra note 6, at 340, 353; 2 TIFFANY, REAL
PROPERTY (2nd ed. 1920) 1202, 1391. For a criticism of tho failure to
afford protection, see Note (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 642, discussing Taft v.
Bridgeton Worsted Co., 246 Mass. 444, 141 N. E. 119 (1923). Eminent
domain cases are: Clapp v. City of Boston, 133 Mass. 367 (1882); Elliott
v. Mason, 76 N. H. 229, 81 Atl. 701 (1911) ; Gorgas v. Philadelphia, H. &
P. Ry., 144 Pa. St. 1, 22 Atl. 715 (1891) ; Strickland v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
154 Pa. St. 348, 26 Atl. 431 (1893) ; Municipal Freehold Land Co. v. Mot•
ropolitan and District Railways Joint Committee, 1 Cab. & E. 184 (Q, B.
1883); Bird v. Great Eastern Ry., 19 C. B. (N. S.) 268 (C. P. 1865) (not
"interest in land", under statute)·; Frank Wl.rr & Co., Ltd. v. London
County Council, L. R. 1 K. B. 713 (1904) (not "interest in land", under
statute). Contm: Miller v. Greenwich, 33 Vr. (62 N. J. L.) 771, 42 Atl.
735 (1899). In Holt v. Gas Light and Coke Co., L. R. 7 Q. B. 728 (1872) 1
two tracts of land, not adjoining, had been used as a shooting range, by
reason of a license for hire to shoot over the intervening land. One of tho
tracts was taken. It was held that the possibility of continuance of tho
license should be taken into consideration in assessing the damages in regard to the tract not taken, the statute permitting compensation whon land
not taken was injuriously affected. The court did not feel that it was
awarding compensation for the enforced discontinuance of the lict>nae liS
such.
111 2 LEWIS, op. cit. supra note 8, at 957; 1 NICHOLS, op. cit. 81tpl'a ll(ltO
6, at 352.
112 1 LEWIS, 433; 1 NICHOLS, 280.
As to height of buildings, sec 1
LEWIS, 468; 1 NICHOLS, 277.
113 1 LEWIS, at 469; 1 NICHOLS, 278.
As to other regulations, see 1
LEWIS, 467 ff.; 1 NICHOLS, 271 ff.
11 4 1 LEWIS, 69 ff.; 1 NICHOLS, 404 ff.
The police power as applied to
l'iparian rights is generally denominated the power to improve nnvigati(ln,
'L'he same thought has been expressed by saying that land held by indi·
\'idual owners "is always subject to the servitude in respect of navigation
:reated in favor of the Federal government by the Constitution". Mr.
• :hief Justice Fuller, in Gibson v. United States, supra note 70, at 272,
1'7 Sup. Ct. at 579.
m United States v. Cress, suprct note 78, at 330, 37 Sup. Ct. at 386.
116 1\Ionongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, supra note 54; 1 LEJWlS,
!tl7 ff.; 1 NICHOLS, 68, 361 ff.
•
m Brooks-Scanlon Corp. v. United States, 265 U. S. 106, 44 Sup. Ct.
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It has sometimes been provided by statute, that if a city files
a plat indicating the location of future streets, no compensation
can be secured for buildings thereafter erected upon the land
thus claimed for street purposes. Under a physical conception
of property, the filing of such a plat does not constitute a taking
of the land. There has been no semblance of a physical invasion
or interference. From the standpoint of legal relations, ho\...-ever,
there has been a very serious change in the owner's position. It
was held in Pennsylvania that under such circumstances there
was no taking.118 The position of the doctrine has been greatly
weakened in that state,11\) and in other jurisdictions there has
been agreement that such action constitutes a talting of
471 (1924); Russian Volunteer Fleet v~ United States, 282 U. S. 481, 51
Sup. Ct. 229 (1931); (1931) 4 So. CALIF. REV. 320; 2 LEWIS, 745; 1
NICHOLS, 68. In McGrath v. Boston, 103 1\lass. 369 (1869), the plaintiff
occupied certain land under a written instrument which the court interpreted to be an executory contract with the owner of the fee, and not a
lease. The defendant city gave notice of intention to take a part of the
premises. Sh: months later, during the period covered by the contract, a
new owner of the fee, to whom it had been conveyed by the one vlith whom
the plaintiff had his contract, gave the plaintiff notice to quit, and removed
the plaintiff's furniture. The court states that the plaintiff then moved
out. The city did not enter until over nine months aft-er the plaintiff's
removal. The plaintiff paid rent up to the date of the notice to quit. The
plaintiff was refused compensation upon the ground that he did not have
any interest in the land. The result reached seems to be correct, as it
seems that under the circumstances the breach of the plaintiff's contract
was too remote a consequence of the city's action to be properly attributable to it, and that, as stated by the court, the plaintiff's remedy was to
seek his damages upon the contract. In Omnia Commercial Co. v. United
States, sztpra note 54, impossibility of performance of a contract was a
legally remote consequence of e.."ercise of the war powers, and compenrntion was therefore properly denied. In Cornell-Andrews Smelting Co. v.
Boston and Providence Ry. Corp., 209 :Mass. 298, 306, 95 N. E. 887, 890
(1911)', it was held that in awarding compensation to a lessee the value
of an option to purchase could not be taken into consideration. It was
held that the option did not constitute an estate in the land, but was only
a contract right, which in equity shifted to the fund produced by the condemnation award to the lessor. A statut-e provided for payment of the
fund to a trustee in this contingency. The decision seems correct.
Whatever the nature of the property interests in a corpse may be, it
bas been held that they cannot be ntade the subject of eminent domain
proceedings. University of Louisville v. Metcalfe, 216 Ky. 339, 387 S. W.
945 (1926).
ns In the matter of the District of the City of Pittsburgh, 2 W. & S.
220 (Pa. 1841); Forbes Street, 70 Pa. St. 125 (1871); Bush v. McKeesport
City, 166 Pa. St. 57, 30 Atl. 1023 (1895).
mIn Philadelphia Parkway, 250 Pa. St. 257, 95 Atl. 429 (1915), the
-court indicates an intention to limit the earlier cases to situations where
the filing of the plat is a net benefit to the O'\Yner of the land, through
-enabling him to know where the future channels of travel and transportation will be located.
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property. 120 The almost complete unanimity of the courts in this
connection no doubt has been due to the obviously serious character of the effect of such a situation upon the usability or
salability of the owner's title.
When the Illinois constitution of 1870 was framed, an attempt
was made to insure protection to condemnees, in spite of the
physical conception of property so largely used by the courts,
by ·inserting the words "or damaged" after the word "taken"
in the usual constitutional provision, so as to read, that private
property shall not be taken "or damaged" for public use without
just compensation.121 Similar provisions have now been adopted
in the constitutions of a majority of the states. 122 In opening the
debate upon this provision in the constitutional convention, Mr.
William H. Underwood, advo~ating its adoption, said:
"The courts have decided that cities in their grading, may cut
down lots so as to almost ruin men and subject them to enormous expense, or they may raise the grade of streets so as to
cause water to run upon lots, and make property comparatively
worthless, but that that is a damage for which lot-owners are
entitled to no compensation. That seems the settled law of the
land; so decided in several states, and by the Supreme Court of
the United States. They say it is not taking property, but is an
incidental damage which lot-owners must sustain, by reason of
these public improvements, and for which they are entitled to
no compensation. As I understand this article, it will require
compensation to be made for those damages which necessarily
and naturally rise to a party in consequence of these public
improvements." 123
The debates indicate that the framers of -the Illinois Constitu·
tion were greatly influenced by the use of the word "damage"
in the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 124 and its judicial inter·
pretation in England.m
The leading decision interpreting such a provision as that of
the Illinois Constitution is Rigney v. City of Chicago,12° decided
1 LEWIS, 431; 1 NICHOLS, 282.
ILL. CONS'!'. (1870), art. 2, sec. 13.
122 2 NICHOLS, 844.
12 3 2 DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE S'l'AT.fj OF
ILLINOIS (1870) 1577.
124 Ibid. 1578.
See Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 8 & 9 Viet. c. 18,
§§ 18, 49 (1845). This act requires that compensation be paid for tho
lands purchased, and also "for the damage, if any, to be sustained by tho
owner of the lands by reason of tpe severing of the lands taken from the
other lands of such owner, or otherwise injuriously affecting such
lands ..•."
125 The English law as to compensation for injurious affection of lands,
as developed under this and other acts, is set forth in 6 HALSBURY, LAWS
OF ENGLAND (1909) 43 ff.
126 102 Ill. 64 (1882).
12o
121
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by the Supreme Court of lllinois in 1882. The plaintiff was
awarded compensation because of obstruction of access to a
street through the erection of a viaduct. Thir. Justice Mulkey, in
the opinion of the court, three of the seven justices dissenting,
points out that under the previously existing constitutional provision in lllinois, of the usual type, an "actual physical invasion"
of property was required.127 His reasoning proceeds: While an
actual appropriation or taking was not required, it being enough
that the injury was direct and physical, nevertheless many cases
of great hardship were excluded, such as the case at bar. Under
the old provision, it was the view of the Illinois courts that "any
direct physical injury to the property" of an individual, by means
of which he was substantially deprived of its ordinary use and enjoyment, was a taking. Under the amended provision the requirement of physical injury is not abandoned. There has been,
however, ambiguity in tile judicial statements of the Dlinois
courts as to the facts necessary to constitute physical injury, because of the use by the courts of the term "property'' in this connection. This ambiguity can be obviated, and the change in the
constitution given proper effect, by adopting the conception of
property as consisting of legal relations. Therefore, he concludes, "under the present constitution it is sufficient if there
is a direct physical obstruction or injury to the right of user or
enjoyment, by which the mvner sustains some special pecuniary
damage in excess of that sustained by the public generally." t::s
It seems unfortunate that the court should retain a physical
requirement in the test for· an obstruction or injury to 'vhat it
so carefully points out are intangibles, and the opinion indicates
the difficulty in abandoning physical concepts in habits of
thought. Just what the court has in mind in requiring a "direct
physical obstruction or injury" to legal relations is not clear. It
is not discussed in the opinion, and is not made clear in other
cases.129 Other parts of the opinion would seem to eliminate the
Ibid. 74.
Ibid. 72, 78. At another place in the opinion the requirement is stated
in somewhat different form. It is said that "to warrant a recovery it
must appear there has been some direct physical disturbance of a right,
either public or private, which the plaintiff enjoys in connection with his
property, and which gives to it an additional value, and that by reason of
such disturbance he has sustained a special damage with respect to his
property in excess of that sustained by the public generally." Ibid. 80.
129 Halsbury states that "physical interference" is required. G lLU.SBUR\',
op. cit. supm note 125,-at 32, 46. In Lambert v. Norfolk, lOS Va. 259,
265, 61 S. E. 776, 778 (1908), it is stated that there must be physical
damage to the corpus or to some appurtenant right, and that the dnmnge
must be physical, not to the "feelings, tastes, or sentiments." Other ca:::es
stating the requirement that the interference v:ith legal relations must be
physical are: Austin v. Augusta Terminal Ry., 108 Ga. 671, 674, 31 S. E.
852, 857 (1899) ; Illinois Power & Light Corporation v. Peterson, 3~~ Dl.
127

12s
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requirement. Possibly it is reasonable to conclude that the statement of the requirement, while unfortunate from the standpoint of lucidity of the concepts used in legal thinking, has produced no practical ill effects. It is pointed out in the opinion that
the amended constitutional provision is not intended to reach
every possible injury that may be occasioned by a public improvementP0 This is obviously correct, as every injury sustained by
an individual in an organized society is not legally remediable.
Toward the end of the opinion the view of the English courts in
construing the term "injuriously affected" is adopted, particularly as set forth in McCarthy v. Metropolitan Board of Worlt:s. 131
It is therefore felt that "it was the intention of the framers of the
present constitution to require compensation to be made in nil
cases where, but for some legislative enactment, an action would
lie by the common law." 132 This statement of principle, unlike
the earlier portion of the opinion wh'ich has been ref~rred to,
does not include any physical requirement. It treats the problem
simply as one of working out principles of the law of damages in
accordance with the social policy of eminent domain proceedings.133 While the principles developed in other connections will
not always afford a sufficient guide, 134 certainly all possible bene342, 347, 153 N. E. 577, 579 (1926); East St. Louis Light & Power Co. v.
Cohen, 333 Ill. 218, 222, 164 N. E. 182, 184 (1928); Stuhl v. Great Northern Ry., 136 Minn. 158, 161, 161 N. W. 501, 502 (1917); Gottschalk v.
Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 14 Neb. 550, 560, 16 N. W. 475, •179, 14 Nob. 561,
17 N. W. 120 (1883); Haney v. G. C. & S. F. Ry, 3 Will. § 278, § 279
(Tex. Civ. App. 1887). On the facts none of the cases cited throw any
light upon the content of the requirement.
130 Rigney v. City of Chicago, supra note 126, at 80.
131 L. R. 7 C. P. 508 (1872).
132 Rigney v. City of Chicago, supra note 126, at 81.
133 A similar conclusion has been reached in interpreting such a provision in the constitution of another state. City of Tulsa v. Horwitz, 131
Okla. 63, 65, 267 Pac. 852, 854 (1928). The opinion quotes with approval
20 C. J. 674, to the effect that such a constitutional provision includes 41all
damages or injuries arising fro·m the exercise of the right of eminent
domain which cause a diminution in the value of private property, whether
this results directly to the property, or is but an interference with tho
:tight which the owner has to the legal and proper use of tho same." Seo
City of Amarillo v. Tutor, 267 S. W. 697, 699 (Tex. Comm. of App. 1924).
The encyclopedia immediately follows the quotation with an incorporation in its text of the requirement, "generally held," of a "physical interference."
Dillon suggests that under such a constitutional provision recovery
"must ..• be limited to cases where the co1·pus of the owner's property itself, or some appurtenant right or easement connected therewith or by the
law annexed thereto, is directly (that is, in general, if not always, physically) affected, and is also specially affected (that is, in a manner not
common to the property owner and to the public at large); and such direct
and special injury must be such as to depreciate the value of tho owner's
property". 3 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPCRATIONS (5th ed. 1911) 1610,
134 For example, at common law, with few exceptions, a man may build
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fit should be derived from the general law of damages wherever
the situations presented are essentially analogous.m
Nichols argues that the states which have failed to adopt constitutional provisions in regard to "damaging" as well as "taking" property have indicated by such failure their deliberate
choice of a physical conception of property in this connection.13n
He therefore concludes that it is no longer open to question in
those states that a "damaging" does not constitute a "taldng".
This would mean that in such a state no court could ·with propriety adopt for eminent domain purposes a conception of property as consisting of legal relations. It is submitted that this
viev;r is entirely erroneous, as it overlooks the difficulties to be
encountered and the popular inertia to be overcome in securing
any constitutional amendment.I~7
It has been pointed out that under a legal relations conception
of property a constitutional amendment adding "damaging" to
"taldng" is unnecessary.m In this connection it has been suggested, not only that the cases adopting a physical conception
have been too narrow in giving a meaning to the term "property'', but also that they have erred "in holding that the right
of recovery rested upon the constitution, rather than upon the
common law or upon an inherent right superior to any legislative enactment." 13 ~ That portion of the argument which relates to "inherent right" would be rejected by many modern
thinkers, but the contention can ,..,.en stand 'Yithout that support.
If the view that there is a principle of justice, apart from constitutions, requiring compensation is adopted, the only effect of a
constitutional provision in regard to compensation is to prevent
the legislature from destroying the citizen's right to receive it.
It has been suggested that when a "damaged" pl'O\'ision is
any sort of an erection upon his own land. A different problem is presented when an erection is built in a street.
13~ See note 175, infra.
1361 NICHOLS, 306.
•
137 In this connection the writer recalls an interesting round table discussion at one of the meetings of the Association of American Law Schools.
Professor Edwin R. Keedy, of the University of Pennsylvania, outlined a
number of needed reforms in the field of criminal procedure. Professor
Edson R. Sunderland, of the University of Michigan, the great leader of
the American bar in matters of procedural reform, opened the discussion
with remarks commencing about as follows: "Why is it that l:lrr. Keedy
can present in fifteen minutes reforms which we all agree are good, and
which it would take about one hundred years to put into effect? The reasons can all be summed up in one word-constitutions.''
1 3 8 l\ir. Justice Whiting, in Hyde v. Minnesota, Dakota & Pacific Ry.,
29 S.D. 220, 2:30. 136 N. W. 92, 95 (1912); Davis, Constitz!ticmal Pmt>ivitms
Against Damaging Prirate Property (1902) 8 VA. L. REG. 525.
139 Sea Hyde v. 1\Iinnesota, Dakota & Pacific Ry., supm note l:JS, at 2!JQ,
136 N. W. at 95. Consult Grant, op. cit. supra note 3.
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added, "taking" should be restricted to cases where the owne1· is
deprived of title.14° Frequently constitutions require payment of
compensation in advance in case of a taking, but not in connection with a damaging. 141 For this purpose there are practical
considerations in support .of a distinction based upon the importance of the legal relations affected. There is also more liberality in granting injunctive relief in connection with acts considered takings than with those thought of as only amounting to
the infliction of damage.142 A distinction here based upon the extent of the consequences of the contemplated action is in harmony with fundamental principles of the law of injunctions.
The problem of the nature of the conception to be used in administering eminent domain proceedings has sometimes been
presented in· situations where there unquestionably has occurred
a taking of property, under either of the concepts discussed. A
question has arisen as to what parties are to be recognized as
having property interests entitling them to compensation, or it
has been necessary to determine how far the property interests
of those receiving compensation extend.143 In the solution of any
problem, the selection of the persons to receive compensation,
and of the elements of loss or injury to be taken into consideration in assessing damages, is a measure of the extent of property.
It is settled that life tenants and tenants for years Ol' from
year to year are entitled to compensation.144 On the other hand,
it seems clear that tenants by sufferance and trespassers have no
legal relations entitling them to compensation.115 It generally
has been so held in regard to tenants at will.140 This result has
Ho Mr. Justice Crow, in Milwaukee Terminal Ry. v. City of Seattle, SG
Wash. 102, 107, 149 Pac. 644, 646 (1915). See Fenton v. City of Seattle,
132 Wash. 194, 198, 231 Pac. 795, 796 (1925). The distinction is jurlsdic·
tiona! in the Court of Claims. In connection with a taking there is an
implied contract to pay, and jurisdiction. A damaging constitutes only
a tort, when there is no jurisdiction. Sanguinetti v. United States, 55 Ct.
CI. 107 (1920), aff'd, cit. supra note 83; cf. State of Alabama "· United
States, 282 U.S. 502, 51 Sup. Ct. 225 (1931).
141 1 NICHOLS, 307.
142 2 LEWIS, 1611.
143 See Matter of City of N. Y. (Manhattan Ry.) 126 Misc. 879, 216 N.
Y. Supp. 2 (Sup. Ct. 1926); modified, 229 App. Div. 617, 243 N. Y. Supp.
665 (1st Dep't 1930); Note (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 779; Nelles, A Construe·
tive "Property Right" and Its "Value" (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 1074; Corbin,
The Elevated Rail1.pay Condemnation Case-Ancither Atwlysis of tho
Property Interests involved (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 1039. This case pro·
sents the interesting and novel question whether, upon co;ndemnation of an
elevated railroad in a city street, the railway company is entitled to compensation for the right to impair light, air, and access.
144 2 LEWIS, 952; 1 NICHOLS, 338.
145 1 NICHOLS, 340, 343.
HG United States v. Inlots, Fed. Cas. No. 15,441a (S. D. Ohio, 1873};
E!Jlerson v. City of Somerville, 166 Mass. 115, 44 N. E. 110 (1896); Hannn
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been reached, apparently, either upon the theory that a tenancy
at will has no market value, or upon the technical theory that the
nature of the estate is such as to render impossible its consideration in eminent domain proceedings.
The facts of one of the cases denying compensation to tenants
at will 147 present the question whether such a holding accomplishes, as far as is practicable, the social purpose of eminent domain proceedings to prevent loss to condemnees. The tenants at
\Vlll were liquor dealers, renting from a brewer. They purchased
their beer from the landlord, and as 1·ent paid him twenty-five
cents per barrel more than the usual price. The tenants had relied upon the arrangement sufficiently, and had considered it of
·enough value, to erect a number of buildings upon the land. It
was a reasonable inference that the lessor was profiting by the
arrangement, and that, as a practical matter, he would have permitted it to continue indefinitely if condemnation had not intervened. It was held that termination of the lessor's estate by condemnation proceedings determined the lease of the tenants at
will, and made them tenants at sufferanc:e of the condemning authority, and they were refused compensation. It was said, by
way of dictwn, that the change in the nature of the tenancy was
not of any practical importance, as all that they were entitled
to in any event was notice, and a reasonable time to remo\·e their
goods and fi:\.-tures.
Looking at the situation from the standpoint of the legal relations of the human beings involved, the lessees had a conditional
privilege to continue to use the premises, subject to a power of
revocation in the landlord. They had a right that they should
not be interfered with before such revocation. The question
presented is whether, assuming that a financial value to the
lessees is involved, it is not practicable, in eminent domain proceedings, to recognize such legal relations as constituting property, fOl~which compensation should be made. Such action does
not call for reduction of the compensation to be paid the landv. County of Hampden, 250 Mass. 107, 145 N. E. 258 (1924) ; Lyons v.
Philadelphia & R. Ry., 209 Pa. St. 550, 58 Atl. 924 (190.!); Canadian
Pacific R. W. Co. v. Brown :Milling Co., 18 Ont. L. Rep. 81> (1909) (not
"person interested," under Canadian act). Contm: Sheehan v. City of
Fall River, 187 :Mass. 356, 73 N. E. 544 (1905) ; Cole v. Ellwood Power Co.,
216 Pa. 283, 65 Atl. 678 (1907). Sheehan v. City of Fnll River is unlil;e
the other cases cited in this note in that the tenancy at will continued to
exist. The grade of a street was changed, under a statute providing for
t}le payment of "all damages sustained by any person in his property."
The lessee was awarded damages because of injury to a building which,
as between her and the owner of the fee, was a tenant's ib..-ture, rubject
to removal. She also received compensation because of tempornry interference with access. A settlement by the condemning authority v.ith the
landowner -had not included her damages.
147 Lyons v. Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co., sup;-a note 14G.
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lord, as the presence of satisfied tenants does not lessen the
market value of the premises or their value to him.
If the condemning authority secures a conveyance from the
owner of the fee, the problem is still in substance the same. Such
a conveyance is voluntary only in the sense that the owner is
willing to submit gracefully, rather than to await condemnation
proceedings. The question remains, whether, as matter of sound
social policy, compensation should not be paid to the tenant at
will because of the proximate effect of such action upon his logal
relations. It may seem that an affirmative answer will mean that
a condemning authority will be required to pay more to secure
land than a private individual. It may be said that while the
latter can purchase from the owner of the fee and let the owner
terminate the tenancy, the condemning authority will have to
make payment to both parties. But while the private purchaser
will have only one payment to make, in the bargaining process
he will not have the assistance of a threat of eminent domain
proceedings. It is therefore doubtful whether, in the long run,
the condemning authority will be out more than the private
buyer. Even though an additional payment is required, there is
still reason for holding that the legal relations of the parties
should be adjusted in this way. Forced transactions and voluntary ones are not the same. A valuable economic situation is created when land is occupied by satisfied tenants, regardless of the
character of the legal tenure. Both landlords and tenants pay
brokers substantial sums to create such situations, and no sufficient reason is seen why courts should be blind to them. If both
landlord and tenant sustain losses, both should be awarded compensation..
The practical situation is essentially the same where, as the
result of condemnation proceedings against the landlord (or purchase by the condemning authority from him), a tenant from
year to year is given the required notice to quit. Lord Tenderden's reasoning in awarding compensation to such a tenant 1411
under the Hungerford Market Act 149 is capable of wide applica14s Ex Pa1·te Farlow, 2 B. & Ad. 3';11 (K. B. 1831). King v. Hungerford
Market Co. (Ex Parte Still), 4 B. & Ad. 592 (K. B. 1833). Acctn'd, as to
tenant ousted at expiration of fixed term, King v. Hungerford Market Co.
(Ex Parte Gosling), 4 B. & Ad. 596 (K. B. 1833).
149 Loc. & Pers. Pub. Acts 11 GEo. IV c. 70 (1830),
The language of
this statute differs from the American constitutional provisions. In § 19
it specifically includes tenants at will and occupiers among those entitled
to compensation, and provides, inter alia, for the pay'ment of compensation
to any person who "shall or may sustain or be put unto any loss, damage,
or injury, in respect of any interest whatsoever, for good-will, improvements, tenant's fixtures, or otherwise, which they may now enjoy by l'cnson
of the passing of this Act." From a legal relations standpoint it is be·
lieved that these differences, except as to the reference to occupiers (who,
as such, probably would not have any legal relations which otherwise
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tion. He said :
"Now it seems perfectly clear that if this act had not passed,
the tenants and occupiers would not have been all dispossessed,
as they will be under the act. It is said 'the interest which they
now enjoy' must be taken to mean a legal interest, and th..'\t all
legal interest was determined by the notice to quit. But I think
this is not the fair meaning of the words, and that they must be
understood as signifying that sort of right which an occupier
ordinarily has, of parting with his tenancy to another person
for such sum as he may be induced to give for goodYdll, fb..."tures,
and improvements, and which is often very considerable though
the tenancy be only from year to year, where there is a confidence
that it ·will not be put an end to. Tlus interest, feeble as it may
be (since it is always determinable at a short notice), may justly
be considered as matter of value to the owner, and to any other
party who becomes the purchaser.1 G0
In a Maryland case a tenant who had had a number of successive leases, each for a term of one year, was awarded compensation for loss of the possibility of renewal. 1\Ir. Justice Bryan
said:
"The evidence tended to show that Rice's brickyard, though
held by a precarious tenure, had a large market value. A thing
is worth what it can be sold for. If Rice's interest would sell
properly could be recognized in such proceedings), are immaterial. The
learned justices stressed the inclusion of the term "good-·will.'' See Ez
Parte Farlow, supra note 148, at 347. The reporters, at 349, have attached a note in regard to another case where the tenant held "on an
agreement for one year certain from 1\lichaelmas 1822, with liberty to the
landlord afterwards to determine the tenancy in any year at three months'
notice, and with a stipulation also that the tenant should not underlet or
give up possession of the premises without leave in writing. The Court
was of opinion that these conditions of holding, especially the last, essentially distinguished this case from the preceding • • • " In a note to
King v. Hungerford Market Co. (E:c Parte Still), supra note 148, at 595,
the reporters state, as to the interest of the tenants in the three cases
cited supra note 148: "Such an interest, it may be presumed, would be
too slight and precarious to be noticed at law or in equity, if it were not
upheld .... by conclusive words in an Act of Parliament." In n ca~e under
another statute, the Liverpool and Manchester Railway Act, Loc. & Pers.
Pub. Acts 7 GEo. IV c. 49 § 47 (1826), where the term "good-will" was
omitted, a distinction was made upon that ground, and compem:ation
denied to a tenant for a fbced term ousted at the expiration of his term,
the condemning authority having taken a· deed from the reversioner. The
tenant was said to have "merely a hope of renewal on the old terms, which,
if there has been an improvement, were not likely to be granted, ·where
there would have been a competition." Lord Denman, in King v. Liverpool
and Manchester Ry., 4 Ad. & E. 650, 656 (K. B. 1836). This result was
reached, although the act included occupiers, and provided for compem:ation for "detriment, injury, damage, loss, inconvenience, or prejudice.''
15o Ex Pm·te Farlow, supra note 148, at 345.
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for $4,000, it is worth $4,000, and the destruction of it would injure him to that extent. It would be confiscation, pure and simple, to take it from him without paying him its value. It is not a
question of the permanency of his-title to real estate, but of the
salable value of such interest as he had.... The jury had a right
to consider the probability of a renewal of Rice's term, because
the evidence tended to show that this circumstance increased
its market value." 151
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts expressly refused to follow this case. Mr. Chief Justice Holmes said, l'eferring to the facts of the case he was then deciding :
"It appeared that the owners had been in the habit of renewing
the petitioners' lease from time to time, and an attempt Was made
to give this fact the aspect of an English customary right. '£he
evidence merely showed that the landlords and the tenants were
mutually satisfied and were likely to keep on together. It added
nothing except by way of corroboration to the testimony that
they both intended to keep on. Changeable intentions are not an
interest in land, and although no doubt S\lCh intentions may have
added practically to the value of the petitioners' holding, they
could not be taken into account in determining what the respondent should pay. They added nothing to the tenants' legal
rights, and legal rights are all that must be paid for. For as
under the statutes the land was to be valued as a whole, and then
the amount subdivided (St. 1896, c. 516, sec. 23; Pub. St. c. 112,
sees. 95, 100, 107; Id., c. 49, sees. 18, 22, 25), the view opposite
to ours would allow the tenants to diminish the share of the
landowners on the strength of the latter having entertained an
intention which they were free to change if they chose." m
m Mayor of Baltimore v. Rice, 73 Md. 307, 311, 21 Atl. 181, 182 (1891).
The landlords' agent testified that the land in question was part of a larger
tract which had been leased to numerous tenants in this way for half a
century. The owners derived large revenues from such leases, and never
removed a tenant who paid his rent promptly. A number of the tenants
had erected expensive improvements, and the agent testified that ho had no
doubt that the expectation of a renewal added largely to the market value
of their interests.
Under a Canadian statute the possibility of securing renewal of a lease
has been taken into consideration in assessing damages. McGoldrick v.
King, 8 Can. Exch. 169 (1902). Likewise, under a statute, in condo:mnatlon
proceedings against a hotel, possibility of securing renewal of tho liquor
license has been taken into consideration. In re Cavanagh and Canada
Atlantic Ry., 14 Ont. L. R. 523, 529 (1907).
152 Emery v. Boston Terminal Co., 178 Mass. 172, 185, 59 N. E. 763, "/65
(1901). The case involved the taking of a wharf. At the time possession
was taken, the tenants were in under a lease for a fixed term. It was hold
that evidence was correctly excluded which would, at most, have proved
an arrangement for the tenants to hold at will beyond the expiration of
the term.
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Under the terminology suggested by Hohfeld, the tenants in
this case had beneficial liabilities 1r. 3 to have created in each of
them, at the expiration of the existing term, the group of legal
relations constituting the position of tenant for a future term.
The landlords had correlative powers m to bring these legal relations into existence. These powers and liabilities were destroyed by the condemnation proceedings. This was done without regard to the volition of the individuals concerned, and if
they thereby sustained substantial loss, the social policy of eminent domain proceedings required that they receive compensation. In making practical adjustments of such matters, in the
absence of relevant evidence it could well be assumed that neither
landlord nor tenant would enter into a lease upon an improvident
basis, in accordance with what the court or jury might conceive
to be their respective standpoints. But the best evidence as to
what they would do is what they have done in the past, and in a
case involving a tenant who is in possession, this evidence will
ordinarily be present. Assuming similar conditions, this should
govern the determination of the amount of their t·espective
losses, and any opinion of court or jury as to the improvidence
of either would be irrelevant. It seems that a court would have
no hesitation in thus adjusting a situation involving interruption of a lease during its term. In such a situation the e::-..ient
of the losses of the landlord and tenant "ill depend upon the nature of the contract between them, and it is clear that their respective shares of the compensation should be apportioned accordingly.
Using a different method of approach, when a possibility of
renewal of a lease is destroyed, a court should not feel compelled
by juristic necessity to refuse compensation to the tenant. It ''ill
not be questioned that a landlord and tenant have a right that
third parties shall not interfere, by duress or other wrongful
acts, with the future course of their mutual dealings. While there
is no element of wrongdoing in instituting eminent domain proceedings, nevertheless it is a question of policy whether society
should not recognize in the tenant a right not to be interfered
with by such proceedings, so that, in case of invasion of the right,
he will be entitled to compensation. It is simply a question
whether an attempt should be made to compensate him for an
actual loss sustained in that way.
It is stated, in the opinion quoted, that the l\Iassachusetts
statutes require that the land be valued as a whole, and the
amount divided among the various claimants. Interpreting the
statutes from a legal relations standpoint, in referring to land 1"'
HoHFELD, op. cit supra note 1, at 36, 58.
Ibid. 50.
1s~ While the distinction is not material in the present connection, from
1~s
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they do not refer to the physical earth, but to the legal relations
which sufficiently involve the enjoyment of certain physical earth
so as to be cognizable in the statutory proceedings. A determina~
tion as to where to draw the line, as to what legal relations should
be so recognized, should be made upon considerations of social
policy, tempered by the requirements of expediency. The sug~
gestion that an award to the tenant will necessarily diminish
that to the landlord, has already been considered. It may be
granted that the general attitute of the courts, both English and
American, is such as to justify the conclusion that on legalistic
grounds they will refuse to grant the tenant relief in this con~
nection.
The value of land, and of most other objects of value, is based
almost entirely upon unenforceable expectations in regard to the
conduct of other persons.156 When the courts, in any connection,
arbitrarily refuse to consider such expectations, they are closing
their eyes to the most important facts of economic existence. The
question has often been asked, how much good a million dollars
would do a person upon a desert island. The problem of the ef~
feet of expectations upon value was presented in concrete form
in a case in which the damages caused by the abolition of a grade
crossing were being assessed. It was urged that in determining
the value of the petitioners' land its proximity to railroad facil~
ities could not be taken into consideration, as the petitioners had
no right to compel their continuance. Mr. Justice Loring, of the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, anticipating in 1901
the work of the behaviourists, said:
"If the respondent were right in its contention that this fact
could not be consider~d because the petitioners had no legal right
to have the spur tracks continue, the fact ±hat a lot of land is in
the business portion of a city or town in place of in the residen~
tial or other less valuable portion of it, could not be taken into
consideration in determining its market value; the owner of a
lot of land in the business centre of a city has no legal right to
have the business of the city done in that neighborhood; but the
fact that it is done there, and is likely to continue to be done
there, is a fact which affects the market value of the land." 107
a legal relations standpoint a statute referring to "land" p1•esents a dif·
ferent problem from that arising under a constitutional provision that
"property" shall not be taken. Such a statute requires that the legal rola·
tions involved have a reasonably close connection with the enjoyment of
physical earth. The constitutional provision is not so limited.
1GG "Market value" represents a "series of annual incomes capitalized
into a fund of value." ELY AND MOREHOUSE, ELEMENTS OF LAND ECONOM•
ICS

(1924) 241.

1sr New York, N.H. & H. R. R. v. Blacker, 178 Mass. 386, 390, 59 N. E.

1020, 1021 (1901).
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Under a physical conception of the process involved in eminent
domain proceedings, when part of a tract of land is physi~'llly
appropriated the owner may recover the amount of the damage
to the remainder of the tract, even though there could have been
no recovery for such damage, standing by itself.l~ 8 The distinction thus based upon the taking of a part of the tract is made
because of the necessity that is felt that some sort of a physical
appropriation be found to constitute a taking. This requirement
having been satisfied, all the damages sustained are mvarded,
and no difficulty is felt because of the source of any portion of
the loss. The entire amount of the damages is thought of as being
damage because of the taking. There seems to be no justification
for the distinction, other than legalistic, unless as a protection
against the assertion of fictitious claims. The slight effect in that
regard does not seem to be sufficient to justify the discrimination
between two classes of citizens. If the problems of eminent domain proceedings are approached from a legal relations standpoint, there is no necessity for the distinction, and, in fact, it is
entirely meaningless.m From this standpoint, as has been suggested, any assessment of damages is a measurement of the extent of property.
Under a physical conception of the eminent domain process,
the total amount of the compensation paid the owners of various
estates in a single res must necessarily equal the total value of
the res, standing as a unit in a single fee simple estate. From a
physical standpoint the lav;r has no concern with the existence of
various estates. If the value of the res is assessed and paid, the
damages have equalled the e}t..1:ent of the taking, and that amount
must be divided among the owners of the various interests. From
a legal relations viewpoint, the situation of each individual involved must be separately examined, and the total compensation
paid may or may not be more than the value of the land, held as
a single fee simple estate. It was said, in a Massachusetts <:.'lse,
that the relations among themselves of those having various estates in the same tract of land could not be taken into consideration, upon the ground that contracts between the owners of the
various interests could not be permitted to "affect the right of
the government to take the land for the public use, or oblige it to
pay by way of compensation more than the entire value of the
158 2 LEWIS, 1176; 2 NICHOLS, 721, 852, 896.
Various tracts owned by
the same owner are treated as separate tracts for purposes of the distinction. 2 LEWIS, 1207; 2 NICHOLS, 737.
159 The distinction is criticized in County Court of :Marion Co., W. Va.
v United States, 53 Ct. CI. 120, 139 (1918), and Queen v. Essex, 17 Q. B.
D. 447, 452 (1886), rev'd, sub. nom. Cowper ·Esse.'\: v. Local Board for
Action, 14 App. Cas. 153 (1889), and questioned by Mr. Justice Holmes in
Lincoln v. Commonwealth, 164 Mass. 368, 375, 41 N. E. 489, 490 (1895).
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land as a whole." 160 The physical viewpoint is apparent. In an~
other case, in the same court, it was admitted that the sum of
the market worth of the various interests, valued separately,
might exceed the market value of the entire interest in the land,
considered as one estate.101 It was said that it did not follow that
it was unjust to the owners of the various interests to use the
latter method of computation. No reason for this conclusion was
given, but it follows naturally from the use of a physical con~
cept.
In a third case,102 in the same court, the facts were reversed,
and the value of the land as a whole was greater than the actual
damage to the owners of the various interests. Land was being
condemned for street purposes which was already subject to a
private easement of way, light, and air in favor of one of the
parties to the proceeding. It was agreed that if the land was to
be regarded as though held in a fee simple estate by a single
owner it was worth $60,000, but that the damages actually caused
the parties were only $5,000. The court seized upon the fact
that the statute under which the later proceedings were had pro~
vided for compensation for the "damages sustained by the
owners," and awarded the smaller sum. From the standpoint o.f
adjustment of the legal relations involved, this result is correct,
but consistency would have required a holding that what hacl been
taken was an entire single estate in the land, and that, regard~
less of the provisions of the statute, the constitutional provi~
sion in regard to the taking of property required compensation
for that estate. The decision was affirmed by the Supreme
Court of the United States. Mr. Justice Holmes said:
"The only question to be considered is whether when a man's
land is taken he is entitled, by the Fourteenth Amendment to
recover more than the value of it as it stood at the time. . ..
It is true that the mere mode of occupation does not necessarily
limit the right of an owner's recovery. [citing cases] But the
Constitution does not require a disregard of the mode of owner~
ship-of the state of the title. It does not require a parcel of land
to be valued as an unencumbered whole when it is not held ns
an unencumbered whole. It merely requires that an owner of
property taken should be paid for what is taken from him. It
deals with persons, not with tracts of land. And the question is
16° Mr. Chief Justice Gray, in Burt v. Merchants' Insurance Co., 115
Mass. 1, 15 (1874). In the view which the court took of tho cas~, tho
statement quoted was dictum. The case was a condemnation proceeding
instituted by the United States in the name of an agent. The sumo state~
ment was quoted as dictu'm in Cornell-Andrews Smelting Co. v. Boston &
P.R. Corp., 209 Mass. 298, 305, 95 N. E. 887, 890 (1911).
161 Edmands v. Boston, 108 Mass. 535, 549 (1871).
162 Boston Chamber of Commerce v. City of Boston, 195 Mass. 338, 81
N. E. 244 (1907), aff'd, cit. supra note 26.
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what has the owner lost, not what has the taker gained.1 ~ 3 We
regard it as entirely plain that the petitioners were not entitled
as matter of law to have the damages estimated as if the land
was the sole property of one owner...." lG~
This reasoning, applied consistently, would seem upon constitutional grounds to prevent use of the value of the land as a
single estate to limit the compensation paid the owners of the
various interests.1 ~~
In a case involving a ground rent, l\:Ir. Justice Boyd, of the
Court of Appeals of l\Ia11dand, recognized that in order to do
justice to all the parties concerned, it would sometimes be neces- .
sary to make exceptions to the general rule of valuing the land
as a single estate and then dividing the proceeds. He said:
" ... We are ... of the opinion that owing to the peculiar
character of this class of property, if it be proven that the reversioner's interest was worth ~10,000 and the leaseholder's ~52,500,
the latter sum could be allowed, although the whole property, if
no ground rent had been on it, would only have been worth
$60,000. We say that because each is entitled under the Constitution to be compensated in damages for the amount of his interest taken, and, if it be true that the values of the two interests are more than what the lots would be worth, if owned by one
person, the necessities of the case require an apparent exception
to the general rule announced above as to what the condemning
party must pay.... Indeed when a piece of property which is
subject to an ordinary lease for a short term is taken, it may
happen that although the owner of the fee is allowed full value
for the property, the tenant must also be paid a large and substantial amount in addition, by reason of the value of his
lease." 1 '36
When condemnation of land necessitates removal or discontinuance of a business which has been conducted upon it, elements of damage such as loss of profits, destruction of good will
or going concern values, or expenses of removal, m·e frequently
present. The speculative character of the losses often is such as
to justify, upon practical grounds, a refusal to attempt to assess
the damages. The decision as to whether conipensation should
be made generally has been reached, however, upon purely legal163 This is the usual method of approacl1.
Hale, l•al1~c to the Tal:cl' in
Condemncition Cases (1931) 31 CoL. L. REV. 1. This article dil::cus:;:-es the
interesting question whether special value of the premises to the taker can
be permitted to affect the market value, as determined for purp.oEes of
compensation. Ibid. 10.
16"' Boston Chamber of Commerce v. City of Boston, supm note 26, at 194,
30 Sup. Ct. at 460.
165 Cf. cases discussed in 2 LEWIS, 1253, and 1 NICIIOLS, 707, '109.
1661\Iayor of City of Baltimore v. Latrobe, 101 1\Id. 621, 631, 61 Atl.
203, 206 (1905); see State v. Hall, 28 S. W. (2d) 80, 82 ()lo. 1930).
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istic grounds, with a physical conception of the eminent domain
process in mind.161 Thus, Mr. Justice Brandeis has said:
"There is no finding as a fact that the Government took the
business, or that what it did was intended as a taking. If the
business was destroyed, the destruction was an unintended incident of the taking of lands." 168
In another case compensation for business losses was refused,
although a statute provided for compensation for 11 all damages
that may be sustained," as it was reasoned that the petitioners
were claiming only as landholders suffering from the taldng of a
portion oftheir land.m From the standpoint of the legal rela·
tions involved, in all cases of business losses there has been vio·
lation of the right of the one owning or leasing the land, and
conducting the business thereon, not to be disturbed in his occupancy of the premises, and to the extent that such 1·ight has
been violated his property has been taken. Mr. Justice John B.
Gibson, before he became Chief Justice, based a refusal of com·
pensation in such a case upon the ground that such losses are
"only collateral to the assuming of the rights of the citizen." 110
In reply to the cases denying compensation for loss of profits, it
has been well said :
"By changing the words of Lord Coke from 'What is property
but the use thereof' into 'What is business but the profits therefrom,' the contention that the business is not taken or damaged
appears to be answered. Nothing could be more absurd than to
say that a retail grocery business forced through eminent do·
main proceedings to leave the community wherein each and every
one of its customers resided, is not taken or damaged." 111
In a case refusing compensation for expenses of removal, the
interesting suggestion is made that: 11As the title to all property
is held subject to the implied condition that it must be surren167 Compensation generally has been denied.
As to profits: 2 LEWIS,
1271; 1 NICHOLS, 698; 2 ibid. 1170, 1173. As to good will: 2 LEWIS, 1276 i
1 NICHOLS, 366, 685; 698. As to expenses of removal: 2 LEWIS, 1274, 1277;
1 NICHOLS, 697. Contra, as to going concern values: 1 NtOHOLS, 685;
semble, ibid. 665; 2 LEWIS, 1176, 1228.
The English view is more liberal, and allows compensation fox• nll tho
items mentioned. 6 HALSBURY, 36.
1as Mitchell v. United States, supra note 82, at 345, 45 Sup. Ct. nt 204.
In this case the flooding of land for reservoir purposes necessitated tho
sale of cattle.
1G9 Mr. Chief Justice Shaw, in Boston and Worcester R.R. v. Old Colony
R. R., 12 Cush. (66 Mass.) 605, 611 (1853).
1-;o Schuylkill Navigation Co. v. Thoburn, 7 Serg. & R. 411, 422 (Pn.
1821). This is the great leading case in this connection.
m (1916) 4 CALIF. L. REV. 248, 249.
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dered whenever the public interest requires it, the inconvenience
and expense incident to the surrender of possession are not elements to be considered in determining the damages to which
the owner is entitled." 172 The implication of such a condition,
without any consideration of the practical aspects of the situation, is a highly legalistic method of solution of the problem. If
such a condition is to be implied, presumably as a part of the
social compact, it would seem that the comt might well imply
a like condition that the fee simple title is held subject to the
existence of necessity for its surrender when required for the
public welfare, and thus avoid the payment of compensation altogether.173
It is neither necessary nor desirable that legalistic considerations have any place in connection with the awarding of compensation in eminent domain proceedings. Considerations of
policy should control. If from the standpoint of policy it is desirable that a citizen have compensation, there should be no hesi..:
tation, under constitutional provisions, in awarding it to him.
The legal relations of au -individual cover every aspect of his
e}..-istence, and when there is violation of these relations his property is taken.174 Manifestly, it is not practicable for society to
compensate the individual for every such consequence of condemnation proceedings, any more than it is feasible for the courts
to take into consideration the remote consequences of torts or
other occurrences. The problem is one of practical expediency.
The judicial experiences in the administration of eminent domain
proceedings-indicate that it is important that the problem be recognized, in this field as elsewhere, as one of drawing the line
1721'1lr. Justice Clark, in Ranlet v. Concord R.R., 62 N. H. 561, 564
(1883).

173 In State v. Dawson, 3 Hill (21 S. C.) 100, 102, 104-105 (1836), it was
suggested that in every grant of land by the st3te there was an implied
reservation that land and timber and other materials might be taken for
road purposes. The authority to take land is di:;:cussed at length in Lindsay v. East Bay Street Com'rs, 2 Bay (2 S. C.) 38 (1796). In Wilcox"·
Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 52, 29 Sup. Ct. 192, 200 (1909), where
a public utility was itself condemned, l\lr. Justice Peckham put the reiuEal
of compensation for loss of "good will" values upon the ground that in the
case of monopolistic public utilities any question of "good will" is irrelevant.
This reasoning would undoubtedly strike a responsive chord in the minds
of many consumers, and does not seem to be open to criticism.
1H ''If the railway encroaches in any degree upon the plaintiff's proprietary rights, then it is clear that the constitutional inhibition, which forl?ids the taking of private property for public use 'without just comprmsation,' applies to the case." l\Ir. Justice Selden, in Williams v. New York
Central R.R., 16 N. Y. 97, 100 (1857). The case involved an added burden on a highway.
For an interesting comparative study of extensh·c interference with
legal relations without compensation, see Barker, Nnt• Lalt'S and Nationalism in llfe::cico (1927) 5
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between proximate and remote consequences.m
It may be suggested that in all fields of thought the early,
simple concepts are of a physical character, and that advance is
made to concepts of a more abstract nature. Such a change may
be regarded as inevitable as more complicated problems are
solved or old problems are given more delicately adjusted solutions. It may be suggested that the history of both the physical
and the social sciences evidences such development.110 Whether
the general suggestion be justified or not, it is believed that the
thought is pertinent as applied to the field of eminent domain
and the accomplishment of the social purpose therein involved.
175 It is sometimes stated that the principles of the general law of
damages apply to acts done under the power of eminent domain. Pool
v. City of Atlanta, 85 Ga. 138, 140, 11 S. E. 582 1 583 (1890) ; Austin v.
Augusta Terminal Ry., supra note 129, at 674, 34 S. E. at 853; Rignoy v.
City of Chicago, supra note 126, at 81; O'Brien v. City of St. Paul, 25
Minn. 331, 334 (1878) ; Stuhl v. Great Northern Ry., supra note 120, at
161, 161 N. W., at 502; In re Hull, 163 Minn. 430, 453, 204 N. W. 534, 539
(1925); Indian Creek Drainage Dist. No. l;,,y. Garrott, 123 Miss. 301, 321,
85 So. 312, 319 (1920); Thompson v. Androscoggin Co., supra; note 07, at
554; Columbia Delaware Bridge Co. v. Geisse, 55 N.J. L. 558, 563 (1871);
Staton v. Norfolk & Carolina R.R., supra note 11, at 288, 16 S. E. at 18•1;
Hyde v. Minnesota, Dakota & Pacific Ry., supra note 138, at 235, 136 N.
W. at 98; G. C. & S. F. Ry. v. Fuller, 63 Tex. 467, 471 (1885); Lambot•t
v. Norfolk, supra note 129, at 259, 61 S. E. at 778; Smith v. St. Paul,
Minneapolis & 1\i. Ry., 39 Wash. 355, 360, 81 Pac. 840, 842 (1905); 6
HALSBURY, 44, 49; 1 LEWIS, 57, 444.
At other times it is stated that ·in eminent domain proceedings compenBa·
tion will be granted for elements of loss for which no damages would be
awarded in actions between private parties. Lake Erie & Western R.R. v,
Scott, 132 Ill. 429, 436, 24 N. E. 78, 80 (1890); Des Moines Wet Wnah
Laundry v. Des Moines, 197 Ia. 1082, 1090, 198 N. W. 486, 400 (1924);
Woodbury v. Inhabitants of Beverly, 153 Mass. 245, 247, 26 N. E. 851, 852
(1891); Harmon v. Omaha, 17 Neb. 548, 550 (1885); Tidewater Ry. v.
Shartzer, 107 Va. 562, 567, 59 S. E. 401, 409 (1907); 2 NICHOLS, 8531 855,
176 COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM (1924) 3·60 pMsim,
165, 181, 184-191, 199, 211, 238, 247, 264, 274, 282, 314-320 passim, 374;
Cook, Scientific lVIethod and the Law (1927) 13 A. B. A. J. 303.

APPENDIX A.
Cases, not else,vhere cited, indicating the use of a physical conception of
the eminent domain process. Green v. Swift, 47 Cal. 536, 541 (1874); Bradley v. New York & N.H. R.R., 21 Conn. 294, 309 (1851); Woodruff v. Cat·
lin, 54 Conn. 277, 295, 6 Atl. 849, 854 (1886); Opinion of Westcott, J., in
Public Works, 13 Fla. 700, 701 (1871); Hurt v. City of Atlanta, 100 Ga.
274, 280, 28 S. E. 65, 68 (1896); Less v. City of Butte, 28 Mont. 27, 32.,
72 Pac. 140, 141, 61 L. R. A. 601, 602 (1903); Matter of Hamilton Avenue,
Brooklyn, 14 Barb. 405, 411. (N. Y. Sup. 1852); Atwatet• v. Trustees o£
Village of Canandaigua, 124 N. Y. 602, 609, 27 N. E. 385, 387 (1891);
Godley v. The City, 7 Phila. 637, 641 (Pa. 1869); Salt Lake City v. Enst
Jordan Irr. Co., 40 Utah 126, 137, 121 Pac. 592, 596 (1911); Lund v. Snit
Lake County, 58 Utah 546, 553, 200 Pac. 510, 513 (1921).
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B.

Cases, not elsewhere cited, indicating the use of a legal relations conception of the eminent domain process. Duckett & Co. v. United States, 206
U. S. 149, 151, 45 Sup. Ct. 38 (1924) ; Associated Pipe Line Co. v. Railroad Commission, 176 Cal. 518, 528, 169 Pac. 62, 66 (1917); Tripp v. Overacker, 7 Colo. 72, 74, 1 Pac. 695, 697 (1883) ; Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v.
Public Utilities Commission, 69 Colo. 275, 279, 193 Pac. 726, 728 (1920);
C. & W. I. R.R. v. E. C. Ry., 115 Ill. 375, 385, 4 N. E. 240, 249 (1886);
Evansville and C. R.R. v. Dick, 9 Ind. 433, 436 (1857) ; Kemper v. City
of Louisville, 14 Bush (77 Ky.) 87, 90, 93 (1878); Lee v. Pembroke Iron
Co., 57 Me. 481, 484 (1867) ; Ashley v. Port Huron, 35 :Mich. 296, 301
(1877); Pearsall v. Supervisors, 74 Mich. 558, 561, 42 N. W. 77, 4 L. R. A.
193, 194 (1889) ; Adams v. Chicago, B. & N. R.R., 39 Minn. 280, 290, 39
N. W. 629, 631 (1888) ; Broadwell v. City of Kansas, 75 Mo. 213, 218
(1881) ; Prairie Pipe Line Co. v. Shipp, 305 1\Io. 663, 672, 267 S. W. 647,
649 (1924); City of Omaha v. Kramer, 25 Neb. 489, 493, 41 N. W. 295,
296 (1889); Forster v. Scott, 136 N. Y. 577, 584, 32 N. E. 976, 977, 18 L.
R. A. 543, 547 (1893); Garvey v. Long Island R.R., 159 N. Y. 323, 329,
54 N. E. 57, 58 (1899); Syracuse Solar Salt Co. v. Rome, W. & 0. R. R.,
43 App. Div. 203, 209, 60 N. Y. Supp. 40, 44 (3rd Dep't. 1899), aff'd, 16S
N.Y. 650, 61 N. E. 1135 (1901); Rome, Watertown & 0. R.R. v. Gleason..
42 App. Div. 530, 533, 59 N. Y. Supp. 647, 649 (4th Dep't. 1889); Gordon
v. Village of Silver Creek, 127 App. Div. 888, 891, 112 N. Y. Supp. 54, 56
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